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DurING the year 1940 the Supreme Court closed two broad avenues
freely utilized in the past by those who sought to minimize their sur-
taxes. Until then it had been thought that trust income was taxable to
a settlor only in situations covered by specific sections of the revenue
statutes.' As to assigned income, although there was a conflict in the
lower courts,' the prevailing view tended to regard the assignor as not
liable to a tax thereon if his right to receive the income had become
fixed prior to the time of the assignment. In Helr'eriing v. Clifford3 the
Court ruled that the head of a family could not affect his tax liability
by allocating part of his income among his wife or children through the
medium of a short-term trust over the corpus of which he retained
substantial control; in such a case the trust income, even though not
used to satisfy any legal obligation of the grantor 4 remained taxable
to him. In Helverihg v. Horst0 and Hchering v. Eubank'0 it was held
that taxation of income which a person has a fixed right to receive
without further efforts on his part cannot be avoided by an assignment
made prior to the time when such income becomes due and payable.
To reach these conclusions the Court had recourse to a new and ex-
panded interpretation of the definition of "gross income" contained in
Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act.7 In the Clifford case the broad
tChief, Securities Association Unit, Securities and Fxchange Commission. For-
merly Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Tax Division, Department of Justice.
1. Sections dealing with revocable trusts and trusts for the benefit of the grantor
appear as §§ 219(g) and (h) in the 1924 and 1926 Revenue Acts, and as §§ 165 and 167
in subsequent Acts and in the Internal Revenue Code. The amendments engrafted
from time to time reflect the legislative aspect of the endeavor to keep pace with those
unwilling to contribute their due share to the Treasury.
2. Compare such cases as Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443 (App. D. C. 1931), cert.
denied, 285 U. S. 552 (1932), with Parker v. Routzahn, E6 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. Gth,
1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 606 (1932). See also infra notes 14345.
3. 309 U. S. 331 (Feb. 26, 1940).
4. Had it been so used, it would have been taxable to the grantor in any event
under the line of cases beginning with Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935).
5. 311 U. S. 112 (Nov. 25, 1940).
6. 311 U. S. 122 (Nov. 25, 1940).
7. The wording of this section, insofar as relevant to the cases discussed in this
article, has remained substantially the same in all the Revenue Acts. It now appears in
the Internal Revenue Code as follows: "Gross Income Defined. (a) 'Gross income'
includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for
personal service, . . . of whatever ldnd and in whatever form paid, or from profes-
sions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether
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sweep of that section's language was construed to indicate Congressional
purpose to use the full measure of the taxing power. One of the cate-
gories of "gross income" is there defined as "income derived from
dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the owner-
ship or use of or interest in such property." Presumably this category
was in the mind of the Court when it stated the issue of the Clifford
case to be "whether the grantor after the trust has been established
may still be treated, under this statutory scheme, as the owner of the
corpus."
In the first of the current assignment of income cases8 another cate-
gory was relied upon, namely, "income derived from wages, or compen-
sation for personal service, of whatever kind and in whatever form
paid; also from interest." The Court stated the dominant purpose of
the revenue laws was taxation of income to that individual who earns
or otherwise creates the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit of it
when paid. Such benefit was equally enjoyed, the Court held, when
he who is entitled to receive income derived from interest or compen-
sation makes use of his power to dispose of it in procuring satisfactions
which he would otherwise procure only by the use of the money when
received.
In Harrison v. Schaffner,9 another case involving assignment of in-
come, the Court summarized the rationale underlying the decisions in
both the trust income and the assignment cases. It stated that provisions
like Section 22(a) have uniformly been construed as "not so much
concerned with the refinements of title as with the actual command over
the income which is taxed and the actual benefit for which the tax is
paid." The Clifford, Horst and Eubank cases were among those cited
in support of this statement. The Court continued:
"It was for that reason that in each of those cases it was held that
one vested with the right to receive income did not escape the tax
by any kind of anticipatory arrangement, however skilfully devised,
by which he procures payment of it to another, since, by the
exercise of his power to command the income, he enjoys the
benefit of the income on which the tax is laid." 10
Thus it appears that, for purposes of discussion, the two types of
cases ought not to be pigeonholed separately. The tax practitioner must
weigh the implications of decisions involving both when considering a
real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property;
also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried
on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source what-
ever . . ."
8. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940).
9. 312 U. S. 579 (March 31, 1941).
10. Italics supplied. 312 U. S. 579, 582 (1941).
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problem connected with either. Yet it seems convenient to treat them
separately in this article, especially because during the last year and
a half so many Board of Tax Appeals and lower court decisions have
wrestled" with numerous widely varying fact situations, all of which
have presented the problem whether the settlor of a trust should, for
income tax purposes, be treated as still the owner of the corpus.
THE CLIFFORD CASE
The provisions of the trust instrument involved in the Clifford Case
may be summarized as follows:
Trustee: The grantor.
Cestid: The grantor's wife.
Term: Five years, or less if either the grantor or his wife died.
Reversion: To grantor as to corpus, to the wife as to any accu-
mulated income.
Income: All net income derived from ordinary cash dividends to
be held for "exclusive benefit" of the cestui, all other income to be
added to corpus.
Trustee's Powers:
1. To pay out or accumulate the income;
2. To manage the property with right
(a) to vote trusteed shares;
(b) to sell, exchange, mortgage or pledge securities
constituting corpus or accumulated income on any
terms or for any consideration;
(c) to invest cash constituting corpus or accumulated
income by making even unsecured loans,'- by
deposits in banks, or by buying securities regardless
of their speculative character, rate of return or
legality for trust funds;
(d) to compromise any claims held as trustee;
(e) to hold trust property in any name, including his
own as an individual.
Exculpatory Clause: Liable only for losses occasioned by wilful
and deliberate breach of duties as trustee.
Limitations on Cestui: Neither principal nor future or accrued
income to be liable for her debts; and she could not dispose of the
income in any way until it was actually paid out.
11. The Board has very recently reiterated its observation that "there is some un-
certainty as to the extent of the applicability of § 22(a) under the decision of the Clif-
ford case." Frederick Ayer, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 1 7633 (B. T. A.).
12. The Court assumes that Clifford did not have power to make loans to himself,
presumably because such a deviation from normal fiduciary conduct must be e-plicitly
authorized by the terms of the trust instrument. 309 U. S. 331, 335 (1940). See 1 RZ-
STATFEaSET, TRusTs (1935) § 170(1).
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With regard to the creation and operation of the trust, it was stipu-
lated that "tax effects", though considered, were not the sole motive
for setting up the trust; that the wife had other substantial income; that
she was free to use, and did use, the trust income as she chose; that
the trust was not created and did not operate to relieve the grantor
from liability for family or household expenses; and that a gift tax
was paid on the transfer.
The Court did not assail this trust as invalid under state law,", but
asserted that a device employing such a family arrangement to create
an unreal number of economic units must be probed minutely to ascer-
tain whether it was exempt from the federal income tax. And, according
to the Court, the criterion to determine this under Section 22(a) was
whether the grantor may still be treated as the owner of the corpus. It
concluded that he continued to be its owner because (1) the income
was only temporarily reallocated within the family group; (2) the wife
being the recipient thereof, the grantor indirectly enjoyed its benefits;
and (3) he retained such control over the corpus, particularly over its
investment, that, with immaterial exceptions, his powers as trustee were
equivalent to those which an individual would have had.
Viewed together in a realistic light, the factors of retained control
and the indirect benefits were considered by the Court to leave the
grantor in substantially the same economic position in which he was
prior to the creation of the trust. Hence it held that the Board did not
err when it found that the grantor remained the owner of the corpus
for the purposes of Section 22(a).
The decision was followed by a flood of comment and criticism, as
well as inquiry as to the scope of the newly announced rule.1 4 Most of
13. The Second Circuit's interpretation of the Clifford decision as holding the trust
"valid under state law and [as] involving the relation of trustee and cestui que trust
between the parties" [Commissioner v. Berolzheimer, 116 F. (2d) 628, 630 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940)] seems more accurate than the Board's implication that the Court deemed
Clifford's creation an "illusory trust." William J. Garland, 43 B. T. A. 731 (on re-
hearing, 1941).
14. Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term and Revocable Trusts (1940) 53 HAuv.
L. REv. 1322, 1348; Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem (1941) 54 H-IAIM.
L. REv. 398, 421-22; Nash, What Law of Taxationf (1940) 9 FORDHAmt L. RiV. 165,
188; Nash, Implications of Some Recent Developments in the Taxation of Trusts (1940)
18 TAX MAG. 267, 327; Tye, Federal Taxation of Irrevocable Trusts Reexamined (1940)
18 TAX MAG. 216, 222; Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some
Implications of the Recent Decisions (1941) 35 ILL. L. REV. 779, 794; Magill, The Su1-
preme Court on Federal Taxation, 1939-40 (1940) 8 U. oF Cni. L. REv. 1, 5; Rudiek,
The Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance (1940) 7 LAW & CONTE M'. PRon. 243,
258; Altman, Community Property in Peril (1941) 19 TAX MAO. 262; PAUL, SrUDwS
IrN FEDERAL TAXAnON, THIRD SERIES (1940) 200; Comment (1940) 38 Micu. L. REV.
885; (1940) 53 HAIv. L. REv. 1050, (1940) 24 MINN. L. REv. 1005, (1940) 49 YA,1V
L. J. 1305.
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the adverse comment was bottomed on the proposition that a taxpayer
is entitled to certainty when arranging his affairs and that it is inequit-
able to change the rules of the game by "judicial legislation" when
certain methods for the deflection of income, not rendered nugatory by
specific statutory provisions, have for some time been successfully used
to minimize taxes. But has not the taxpayer blessed with large resources
been advised quite definitely that if his net income amounts to X dollars
it will be subject to certain clearly stated surtax rates? Does not the
law set forth with the utmost clarity the Congressional intent of taxing
at increasing rates in accordance with ability to pay? And have not
the courts for many years, except when confronted with some inescap-
able ca.sus omisszis' or statutory language so unequivocal as to require
remedy through legislation,"0 supplemented Congressional efforts at
blocking attempts to thwart the purpose of successive taxing statutes?1"
To be sure, as Mr. Justice Roberts points out in his dissent in the
Clifford case, the Revenue Acts from the very beginning have provided
for the separate treatment of trusts' 8 and, normally, for the taxability
of trust income not to the grantor but to either the trustee or the
beneficiary.' 9 Yet it is submitted that the term "trust" as used in these
laws should in good conscience be taken to mean a bona fide trust,20
15. See Smietarka v. First Trust & Say. Bank, 257 U. S. 602 (1922); Third Scot-
tish American Tru't Co. v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 279, 282 (Ct. CI., 1941); Hel-
vering v. Bowen, 35 F. (2d) 926, 928 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936); Durr Drug Co. v. United
States, 99 F. (2d) 757, 759 (C. C. A. 5th, 193S).
16. See Shwab v. Doyle, 253 U. S. 529 (1922); Commissioner v. Morris, 90 F. (2d)
962 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). Cf. Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 351, 359 (1938).
17. See Burnt v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 677 (1933); PAUL, STUDIES IN F.-,L
TAXATIOx (1937) 61. But see Kent v. Rothensies, 35 F. Supp. 291, 295 (E. D. Pa.
1940), rev'd, 120 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), where the district court, in a case
involving trust income which the Government deemed taxable to the grantor, noticed that
Congress with respect to such income "wvas frequently concerned with ta-z avoidance,
and from time to time amended the law to meet cases which e.isting statutes were in-
adequate to reach." This, however, continues the opinion, "is no warrant for this court
to take over the task of catching up with the taxpayer."
18. In Kent v. Rothensies, 35 F. Supp. 291, 295 (E D. Pa. 1940), rc'Xd, 120 F.
(2d) 476 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), the district court insisted that Congress has shown no
intention to disregard the trust entity but on the contrary has carefully preserved and
defined it as a subject of taxation; the opinion sounds like an echo of Mr. Justice Rob-
erts' dissent in the Clifford case.
19. Note that the minority fought the whole trend exemplified by the "Section 22(a)
cases" on the basis of statutory interpretation rather than on constitutional grounds. The
Horst case certainly seems to go much farther than Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933).
Perhaps 'Mr. Justice McReynolds, who wrote the dissent in the Horst case, felt that an
argument based on constitutional grounds would have been a -ain recherche da temps
perdu. Cf. N. Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 19, 1935, p. 1, col. 8, attributing to him the state-
ment: "The Constitution is gone."
20. In DuPont v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 544, 545 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), involv-
ing reciprocal sales and repurchases of securities by two friends who wished to establish
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an entity to which the settlor has transferred property completely and
definitively. The fact that Congress has from time to time enacted
certain provisions 21 singling out for taxation to the grantor the income
of several types of trusts, rather habitually used to circumvent its intent,
cannot fairly be interpreted as an implied sanction of other trust arrange-
ments whereby taxpayers have "contrived to keep the larger benefits of
ownership and be relieved of the attendant burdens."' 22  Indeed, Mr.
Justice Douglas, who spoke for the majority in the Clifford case, might
well have echoed a reported utterance of Judge Learned Hand:
"I have been violently criticized by the tax lawyers for having
originated a revolutionary doctrine in the Gregory case, whereas all
that I did was to note the plain intention of Congress which tax
practitioners had preferred to ignore in order that they might be
able to provide simple methods of tax avoidance for their clients." -a
And he might have added that the recent excoriation epitomized in the
somewhat sarcastic title "What Law of Taxation? '2 4 is even less justi-
fied than that hurled at Judge Hand since the holding of the Clifford
case was foreshadowed rather suggestively 2' some years ago by the
alternative ground for decision in DuPont v. Commissioner.2
losses for income tax purposes, Judge Clark said, "The attachment of an artificial it-
portance to the fact of sale placed a powerful weapon in the hands of the taxpayer. In
its selection of this arbitrary criterion, the Congress used the bare phrase 'sale or ex-
change.' . . . The courts filled in the outline with the obviously indicated bona fides."
(italics supplied).
21. See note 1 supra.
22. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 676 (1933).
23. PAUl., op. cit. supra note 14, at 125, n. 388.
24. Nash, loc. cit. supra note 14.
25. See Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable
Person (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rxv. 791, 818, 826.
26. 289 U. S. 685 (1933). Here the Court unanimously held taxable to the grantor
the income of a short-term trust where "the grantor did not divest himself of title in
any permanent or definitive way, did not strip himself of every interest in the subject
matter of the trust estate" (italics supplied). This decision was not followed by such
adverse comment as was occasioned by the Clifford case, very probably because its im-
portance was overlooked, attention being concentrated on Burnet v. Wells, decided the
same day. Or the explanation may be found in the fact that the alternative ground for
decision was deemed to deal only with the constitutional power of Congress and the
validity of § 219(h) of the 1924 and 1926 Revenue Acts [now INT. REv. CoDn § 167(a) (3)
(1939)] as applied to the state of facts presented by the DuPont case; but this view has
not been accepted by one of the Board's oldest and ablest members. See Graham Sum-
ner, 40 B. T. A. 811, 813 (1939), on appeal C. C. A. 2d. And in Benjamin F. Wollman,
31 B. T. A. 37 (1934), the Board held that "the general provisions of the statutes will
support taxation of income to the grantor where he retains powers as broad as in this
case." Cf. Ray, rupra note 14, at 1345. Parenthetically, it may be pointed out that Clif-
ford created the trust which was to cause so much furore more than a year after the
decision in the DuPont case was handed down.
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The inquiry as to the scope of the Clifford doctrine is understandable.
Some commentators2 7 and courts28 appear to assume that future deci-
sions of the Court will set certain fairly precise limits beyond which
a settlor may operate without fear of being swept into the embrace of
Section 22(a). It is submitted that to follow such a course would rob
the holding of its greatest element of strength, which is its very vague-
ness and elasticity. The Court has said to the taxpayer: "If you set up
a trust so hedged about with restrictions that, as a practical matter, you
still have most of the important powers which an outright owner pos-
sesses and feel no poorer as a result of the new creation, then the income
remains taxable to you." This is a perfectly practical test the application
of which will furnish a ready answer in most situations. In borderline
situations, moreover, it does not seem unfair that the taxpayer should
be expected to proceed at his peril since the result of his contriving,
and probably in an overwhelming majority of instances the purpose as
well, is to minimize surtaxes by creating two or more taxable entities
in lieu of the pre-existing single entity which Congress intended to tax.
Taxpayers have long been on notice that "anticipatory arrangements
. . . however skilfully devised" -3 are likely to come to grief. In view
of the Court's well known attitude with respect to these arrangements,
only an incurable optimist will expect a meticulous tracing of the frontiers
bounding the applicability of the Clifford rule.
Such further intimations as the Court has given to date clearly in-
dicate that it regards the concept underlying the Clifford decision as
capable of great expansion rather than subject to limitation. Only two
short-term trust cases have discussed the rule and then by way of
dictum. But the trend of the Court's observations must have chilled
the hopes of those who looked for a strict construction of the Clifford
case.
30
In Helvering v. Fuller" a drastic extension of the Clifford rule was
suggested. There the income of an alimony trust was held not taxable
to the settlor for reasons immaterial to this discussion. The trust was
to endure for ten years after which the property was to go outright
27. See, e.g., Magill, supra note 14, at 5.
28. White v. Higgins, 116 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Commissioner v.
O'Keeffe, 118 F. (2d) 639, 642 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941) ("But the outer limits of the dez-
trine of Helvering v. Clifford have not yet been authoritatively determined.").
29. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
30. But see Commissioner v. Branch, 114 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Hel-
vering v. Palmer, 115 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), aff'g, Carleton H. Palmer, 40
B. T. A. 1002 (1939) ; Kent v. Rothensies, 35 F. Supp. 291 (E. D. Pa. 1940), reid, 120
F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Arthur M. Betts, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv.
1i7116-D (B. T. A. mem.) ; Jessie W. Donahue, 44 B. T. A. 329 (1941) ; Frederic: Ayer,
3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. f17683 (B. T. A.).
31. 310 U. S. 69 (1940).
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to the divorced wife. Although the Court did not pass on the applic-
ability of the Clifford rule because the Government had not raised the
point, Mr. Justice Douglas remarked that the trust agreement might
have left the grantor with sufficient interest in or control over the trust
to make him the owner of the corpus for income tax purposes. It may
be predicted with some confidence that the Commissioner will not fail
to take this broad hint that neither family solidarity, obviously no longer
existent in the Fuller situation, nor the ultimate reversion of the trust
corpus to the grantor, will be deemed by the Court factors indispensable
to bring the income of a term trust within the Clifford rule. No doubt
these elements, where present, will continue to have a cumulative effect
when deciding the problem of ownership, but their absence will not of
itself preclude a finding of ownership based on the all-important con-
sideration of control.3 2
The second decision, Hormel v. Helvering," intimated a somewhat
startling broadening of the family solidarity concept. Although the
Court did not consider the merits but remanded the case so that the
taxpayer might have an opportunity to offer evidence ol the issue raised
by the Clifford rule, Mr. Justice Black thought the chances of taking
the case out of the rule quite remote, saying:
"Here, as there, control over the trusts was completely in the
hands of the taxpayer and his wife. For while petitioner's trust
instruments showed a co-trustee acting with petitioner, the same
instruments also disclosed that such co-trustee could be removed
at any time by the joint action of petitioner and his wife." 4
In this way the Court discounted the independent action of the wife
in any removal of the co-trustee, thus indicating that in family trust
cases it might consider one spouse the alter ego of the other (and, should
it do so, a similar treatment of other close relatives would seem pre-
dictable). Such a conclusion, while pei'haps a logical consequence of
the Clifford case, goes far beyond the refusal of that decision "to treat
the wife as a complete stranger." 3
32. But see Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941)
(income held not taxable to settlor because short-term trust lacked "family purpose
flavor") ; accord, Mars J., dissenting in Commissioner v. Brown, 4 C. C. H. 1941 Fed.
Tax Serv. 19667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
33. 312 U. S. 552 (1941). See (1940) 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 616, (1941) 50 YALE
L. J. 1460.
34. 312 U. S. 552, 559 (1941).
35. The Horinel case also indicates that the Court will make no distinction because
retained powers of control are exercised by the grantor qua trustee, i.e., in a fidtuclary
capacity, a distinction relied upon in Carleton H. Palmer, 40 B. T. A. 1002 (1939), aff'd
sub iwin. Helvering v. Palmer, 115 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). Helvering v.
Richter, 312 U. S. 561 (1941), decided together with the Horniel case, dealt only with
the question whether the Circuit Court of Appeals should have considered the applica-
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It may be argued that by the suggestions thrown out in the Horoel
and Fuller opinions the Court has within the short space of one term
already so expanded the Clifford rule as to render it unrecognizable and
hence obsolete. It must be conceded that the principal factors stressed
in the Clifford case as connoting continuing ownership jIrobably will not
serve as a reliable yardstick for anxious or potential trustors weighing
the chaftces of possible unexpected tax liability. Yet a review of deci-
sions on similar and related issues by lower tribunals since the Clifford
decision may be of interest as reflecting their reaction thereto and pre-
senting, by way of illustration, various new facets of the problem not
touched upon in the principal case.
CLASSIFICATION OF POST-CLIFFORD DECISIONS
A classification of the Board and court decisions which have applied
or discussed the Clifford rule, both with regard to short term trusts
and in cognate fields, can be made in various ways. Grouping the cases
as those which follow, extend or refuse to apply the rationale of the
Clifford case might serve, somewhat in the manner of a Gallup poll,
to give a bird's eye view of the lower tribunals' reaction., But a more
useful approach would seem to be a consideration of the weight given
by these tribunals to various factors when deciding whether or not each
particular situation falls within the rule. In the Clifford opinion stress
was laid on the length of the trust term, the identity of the trustee, the
identity of the beneficiaries, and the control retained by the grantor.
Whereas the Court remarked that all considerations and circumstances
of the kind it had mentioned were relevant to the question of ownership
and hence left the way open for taking cognizance of different or addi-
tional attributes which may be present in other situations,a7 the factors
adverted to in the Clifford decision were, as might be expected, given
primary consideration in the post-Clifford cases. Indeed, they are among
the more usual indicia of ownership present in trusts of the type under
bility of §22(a), first raised by the Commissioner before that tribunal. The Supreme
Court held that it should have done so, but, for the same reason as in the Hor7;:cl case,
gave direction to the court below to remand the case to the Board for rehearing. The
trust here was revocable by the grantor with the consent of his wife at any time Iefore
its termination. This would seem to place control over the trust "completely in the hands
of the taxpayer and his wife," the test adverted to in the Hormcl ca~.. In vie',, of this
circumstance it is difficult to conceive that anv additio nal e: adEnce could result in a deci-
sion in the taxpayer's favor.
36. See appendix, infra pp. 251-52, where the cases are so grouped.
37. In George H. Deuble, 42 B. T. A. 277, 97 (1940), the Board said: "Certain
indicia of control by the grantor appeared in the Clifford case which do not appear so
clearly in the trust presently before us. . . . The decision readied by the Supreme Court
in Helvering v. Clifford was not based solely on any one of the factors present in the
trust before it. Rather, it W as based on the aggregate of all factors of control."
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discussion. Hence it seems appropriate to consider first the treatment
accorded to these factors by the Board and the courts, preserving a
chronological order where necessary in order to trace the development
of an attitude.
LENGTH OF TERM
In Commissioner v. Branch"8 the First Circuit, singling out the state-
ment in the Clifford opinion that certiorari was granted "because of the
importance to the revenue of such short term trusts in the reduction
of surtaxes,""0 refused to apply the rule to a grantor who, while reserv-
ing broad powers of management, had created a trust to run for the
life of the beneficiary, his wife. And the Second Circuit followed the
Branch case without opinion where a family trust with a similar term
was involved."
But it may be asserted with some confidence that these earlier court
decisions 4 have already been modified. In White v. Higgins42 the First
Circuit, while observing that the life insurance trusts there involved
were not short-term trusts, recognized the force of the Clifford observa-
tion that "no one fact is normally decisive" and concluded that the
economic realities, namely, the extent of the settlor's continued dominion
over corpus, required that the income should be taxed to her. A few
months later, the same court remanded to the Board for consideration
of the applicability of Section 22(a) a case involving a fifteen-year
trust,43 and in Commissioner v. Berolheimer4" the Second Circuit did
not hesitate to extend the Clifford rule to a ten-year trust.
38. 114 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
39. 309 U. S. 331, 334 (1940).
40. Helvering v. Palmer, 115 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). In Jones v. Norris,
122 F. (2d) 6 (1941) (20-year trust), the Tenth Circuit also relied in part on the Bratich
case.
41. See also Kent v. Rothensies, 35 F. Supp. 291 (E. D. Pa. 1940), rcv'd on othcr
grounds, 120 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) ; cf. Commissioner v, Prouty, 115 F. (2d)
331 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
42. 116 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
43. Commissioner v. O'Keeffe, 118 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941).
44. 116 F. (2d) 628 (1940). The Tenth Circuit in Cox v. Commissioner, 110 F,
(2d) 934 (1940), cert. denicd, 311 U. S. 667 (1940), held taxable to the grantor under
§ 22(a) the income of a trust for the grantor's life, but it must be noted that the court
felt he had, in effect, a power of revocation. Moreover, the case is complicated by the
fact that it involved cross-trusts and is hence atypical, since such reciprocal transfers
of property, no matter for how long a period, will usually effect no change in tile do-
minion and control exercised by the respective transferors who emerge as trustee-man-
agers of the property transferred by their opposite numbers. Two Board cases holding the
income of long-term trusts taxable to the settlor involve similar situations. Purdon
Smith Whiteley, 42 B. T. A. 316 (1940) ; R. Douglas Stuart, 42 B. T. A. 1421 (1940).
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The Board also seems to have vacillated. It has decided against the
taxpayer in some cases involving lifetime trusts," presumably because
the elements of retained control probably exceeded, in the aggregate,
those reserved by Clifford. Yet, in a number of cases 0 it has adduced
the lifetime or long-term feature of the trust as one of the reasons
for refusing to hold the grantor taxable on the income; none of these
opinions, however, contained any statement as unequivocal as that made
in the Branch case. No clear line as to the permissible length of term
has been drawn. In Frank E. Wolcott47 the Board mentioned as an
element in distinguishing the Clifford case the "long term" of four
trusts which varied between 9 and 22 years, whereas in two other cases
it has held the income of ten-year trusts taxable to the settlor."8 It
should be pointed out that in one of the latter, Snowden Fahnestoch,
the Board relied on the Second Circuit's decision in favor of the Govern-
ment with respect to the ten-year trust of the Bcrolcheinwr case,"n and
that the Wolcott opinion, holding to the contrary, was promulgated prior
to this decision.
If a long-term trust will not necessarily escape the Clifford rule, does
it follow that one created for only a short span of years will inevitably
be within its ambit? The Board in several cases involving trusts of
quite brief duration 0 has answered the question in the negative, usually
45. Morton Stein, 41 B. T. A. 994 (1940); Reginald B. Parsons, 44 B. T. A. 1142
(1941). Another board case involving long-term trusts must be deemed atypical in that
there the income was held taxable to the husband-trustee because the terms of the trust
instrument gave him such control over the corpus that the wife-grantor was deemed in
substance to have made a gift to him, individually, of the corpus when she created the
"trust." H. S. Richardson, 42 B. T. A. 830 (1940), aff'd sub now. Richardson v. Com-
missioner, 121 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). It may also be noted that in a case in-
volving a basis question the Board assumed that the grantor of trusts running for !ev-
eral lives, which, however, were revocable by trustees having non-adverse interests, might
have been taxed during his lifetime on the trust income under the Clifford rule; the bene-
ficiaries were members of his immediate family but the opinion does not indicate that
he grantor reserved any control over the corpus. Minnie M. Fay Trust "A", 42 B. T.
A. 765, 768 (1940).
46. Lolita S. Armour, 41 B. T. A. 777 (1940), on appcal C. C. A. 7th; Antoinette K.
Brown, 42 B. T. A. 693 (1940), rcv'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Brown, 4 C. C. H. 1941
Fed. Tax Serv. 19667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) ; Frank E. Wolcott, 42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940);
Jessie NV. Donahue, 44 B. T. A. 329 (1941).
47. Frank E. Wolcott, 42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940).
48. Snowden Falmestock, 43 B. T. A. 569 (1941); Robert H. Cory, 3 C. C. H. 1941
Fed. Tax Serv. 7272-B (B. T. A. mem.).
49. 116 F. (2d) 628 (1940).
50. Dunlevy T. Milbank, 41 B. T. A. 1014 (1940) (3 and 5 years); Edna B. Elias,
41 B. T. A. 1109 (1940) (7 years), rev'd sub yor. Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941); John P. Wilson, 42 B. T. A. 1260 (1940) (2 years), on appcal
C. C. A. 7th; Elizabeth K. Lamont, 43 B. T. A. 61 (1940) (1 year), on appeal C. C. A.
2d.
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because the grantor was deemed to have retained little or no control.
The Second Circuit, in various opinions interpreting the Clifford case,
has arrived at what may seem an illogical result. In Helvering v.
Achelis5' it insisted that the Clifford opinion did not suggest that a
trust settlor could not so completely sever himself from the income as
to make it no longer his, even though the trust term be short. Yet in
Commissioner v. Buck5'2 this same court" said that the control factor
is sufficiently present merely because a trust is of short duration; this
is true, the court explained, even if there are no express reservations of
control because the grantor will soon reacquire complete dominion"
The beneficiaries of the Achelis trust were not members of the family
group, and in a similar short-term trust situation decided soon there-
after,5" this lack of "family flavor" was seized upon to distinguish the
Clifford case. But such a distinction seems rather unsatisfactory because,
if early reacquisition of dominion over corpus imports control, such
control cannot be deemed affected by the identity of the beneficiaries.
In any event it seems that the length of the trust term is, at most,
a cumulative factor." Indeed, in view of Mr. Justice Douglas' dictum
in Helvering v. Fuller"7 it may be argued that in some cases the longer
the term, the more reason for taxing the grantor. There, it will
be recalled, a ten-year alimony trust had been set up with the corpus
to go to the divorced wife at the end of the term. The observation was
made that the income might be taxable to the settlor under the Clifford
rule because he had retained considerable control over the trusteed
securities."8 If a grantor to whom the corpus will never revert is taxable
51. 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (6 years).
52. 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). See also Commissioner v. Barbour, 122
F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). In Commissioner v. Woolley, 122 F. (2d) 167 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1941), settlor reserved legal, if indirect, control over the corpus of a short-term
trust; hence the summary of that holding as given in Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d)
171, 172 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), seems inaccurate.
53. This volte face seems all the more amazing since two judges, Learned Hand
and Chase, sat in both cases.
54. The dictum of the Buck case may become a well-defined rule, for in Helvering
v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), the court defined "short term" to mean
"six or seven years"; if the term is longer "settlor's legal reservation of control becomes
vital." Thus the court harmonized its decision in taxpayer's favor with reference to the
ten-year trust involved in Commissioner v. Jonas, 122 F. (2d) 169 (1941), promulgated
one day prior to the Elias case.
55. Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). Here set-
tlor, as one of two co-trustees of a four-year educational purpose trust, reserved substan-
tial control over corpus; the Achelis case was followed "though not without some doubt."
56. See Elizabeth K. Lamont, 43 B. T. A. 61, 67 (1940). The absence of a specific
term is immaterial. David M. Heyman, 44 B. T. A. 1009 (1941).
57. 310 U. S. 69, 76 (1940).
58. One circuit court, in a case where grantor "exercised autocratic powers over tIe
trust estate", has held that if he retains "neither the power to revoke, rdVest or reVert
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on its income because he retains control over the corpus for ten years,
would the same not follow a fortiori if he projected his control even
farther into the future?
IDENTITY OF THE TRUSTEE
Just as the short-term element is not a sine qua non for applying the
rule of the Clifford case, so the fact that the grantor did not, as in that
case, appoint himself the sole trustee, has not been- and, it is sub-
mitted, should not be -deemed decisive. True, in one opinion" handed
down shortly after the Clifford decision, the Board laid great emphasis
on the fact that the grantor did not declare herself trustee but appointed
her husband to act as such with all powers of management. Such an
attitude would seem to fly in the face of 'Mr. Justice Douglas' admuni-
tion not "to let mere formalism obscure the normal consequences of
family solidarity,"'0 unless- and this consideration was nowhere urged
by the Board-the justification for treating the husband "as a com-
plete stranger"' is rested on the somewhat doubtful assumption that
the male must always be presumed the dominant marital partner.' -
While it may be noted that with one exception'a all decisions have gone
against the taxpayer-grantor where he has made himself sole trustee,cs
either the corpus or the income . . . there can be no substantial incidents or attributes
of ownership, sufficient to vest in the grantor any of the economic benefits of the trust,
essential to taxation under .. . Section 22(a)." Jones v. Norris, 122 F. (2d) 6-11 (C.
C. A. 10th, 1941). This conclusion is clearly inconsistent with the suggestion thrown out
by 'Mr. Justice Douglas in the Fuller case.
The Board has held that reversion of corpus to the grantor standing by itself is no
reason for the application of the Clifford rule. Reginald B. Parsons, 44 B. T. A. 1142
(1941) ; but that the absence of such reversion is one of the factors which may serve to
distinguish the Clifford case [see John N. Fulham, 44 B. T. A. 1183 (1941)] or, of itself,
will do so. Rose L. Ray, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. f 7474-A (B. T. A. mem.).
59. Edna B. Elias, 41 B. T. A. 1109 (1940) (6 dissented), rcz,'d Mub nom. Helvering
v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). See also Dunlevy T. Milbank, 41 B. T. A.
1014 (1940), where the Board laid some stress on the identity of the trustee-in that
case the grantor's wife-but where additional factors were present which made the case
stronger for the taxpayer.
60. 309 U. S. 331, 336 (1940).
61. Ibid.
62. judge Learned Hand in Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941), assumes a certain amenability on the part of the husband-trustee.
63. Lolita S. Armour, 41 B. T. A. 777 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. 7th. Cf. Edward
H. Heller, 41 B. T. - 1020 (1940), where a father was held to have acted as guardian
in the management of his children's property rather than as trustee.
64. Penn v. Commissioner, 109 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. Sth, 1940); First Nat. Bank
v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Thomson v. Helvering, 114 F.
(2d) 607 (C. C. A. Sth, 1940) ; Commissioner v. Berolzheimer, 116 F. (2d) 623 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1940) ; Reuter v. Commissioner, 11S F. (2d) 698 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; Reuter v.
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no similar convenient rule of thumb can be applied where he has co-
trustees associated with him0 5 or has appointed as trustee a close
relative," a friend or employee,"7 or a bank. 8 Even where a financial
institution has been named, it seems that if the grantor has retained
the power to substitute himself as trustee, he should be regarded for
purposes of decision as the trustee, whether he has seen fit to exercise
the power or not; and, generally, the cases so hold."9 If lie is one of
United States, 34 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. Cl. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 695 (1941),
Snowden Fahnestock, 43 B. T. A. 569 (1941); William J. McCormack, 43 11, T. A.
924 (1941); David M. Heyman, 44 B. T. A. 1009 (1941).
65. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941) ; Cox v. Commissioner, 110 F.
(2d) 934 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 667 (1940); Commissioner v.
Branch, 114 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Helvering v. Palmer, 115 F. (2d) 368
((a C. A. 2d, 1940), aff'g, Carleton H. Palmer, 40 B. T. A. 1002 (1939); White v.
Higgins, 116 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) ; Helvering v. Dunning, 118 F. (2d) 341
(C. C. A. 4th, 1941) ; Commissioner v. O'Keeffe, 118 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941) -
Kent v. Rothensies, 35 F. Supp. 291 (E. D. Pa. 1940), rev'd, 120 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A.
3d, 1941); Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Stan-
ley v. Smith, 4 P. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ]'62,823 (D. Conn. 1941) ; Morton Stein,
41 B. T. A. 994 (1940) ; John N. Fulham, 44 B. T. A. 1183 (1941) ; Estate of Williuin
Childs, 44 B. T. A. 1191 (1941) ; Frederick Ayer, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 17683
(B. T. A.). See also Purdon Smith Whiteley, 42 B. T. A. 316 (1940), where the bene-
ficiary, whom the Board held in effect to be the grantor, was a co-trustee.
66. Dunlevy T. Milbank, 41 B. T. A. 1014 (1940) (wife) ; Edna B. Elias, 41 B. '1',
A. 1109 (1940) (husband), rev'd sub nona. Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1941) ; Antoinette K. Brown, 42 B. T. A. 693 (1940), rev'd sub norm, Comulis-
sioner v. Brown, 4 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 19667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) (brother),
See also Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 162 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940), cerl. densied,
312 U. S. 706 (1941) (wife) ; H. S. Richardson, 42 B. T. A. 830 (1940) (husband),
aff'd sub norn. Richardson v. Commissioner, 121 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Coi-
missioner v. Woolley, 122 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) (wife).
67: Jones v. Norris, 122 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) (confidential employee)
Elizabeth K. Lamont, 43 B. T. A. 61 (1940) (intimate friend), on appeal C. C. A. 2d;
Archibald G. Bush, 43 B. T. A. 535 (1941) (friendly business associate) ; William I.
McKnight, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 17271-B (B. T. A. mem.) (ibid.).
68. Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); George H. Double,
42 B. T. A. 277 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. 6th; Herbert W. Hoover, 42 B. T. A. 289
(1940), opt appeal C. C. A. 6th; Frank G. Hoover, 42 B. T. A. 786 (1940) ; Frank E.
Wolcott, 42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940); Arthur M. Betts, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv,
f1 7116-D (B. T. A. mem.) ; William J. Garland, 43 B. T. A. 731 (oil rehearing, 1941);
Jessie W. Donahue, 44 B. T. A. 329 (1941); Reginald B. Parsons, 44 B. T. A. 1142
(1941). See also Frick v. Driscoll, 4 P. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 162,383 (W. D. Pit,
1941) ; Helvering v. Richter, 312 U. S. 561 (1941); Commissioner v. Ward, 119 F. (2d)
207 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
69. See George H. Deuble, Herbert W. Hoover, Frank G. Hoover (but grantor
likewise held taxable in a year when he did not have the power of substitution), cited
supra note 68. But in Jones v. Norris, 122 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941), and An-
toinette K. Brown, 42 B. T. A. 693 (1940), re-ad sub non. Commissioner v. Brown,
4 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. f19667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), the Board attributes no
weight to the grantor's power to change the trustee, A similar omission in Edna 13.
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several trustees, clearly he should be regarded as though he were the
sole trustee if his powers materially exceed those of his fellows." oir
if his powers enable him to control all of their activities.1 In the Hormel
case72 the Supreme Court, we have seen,7" intimated that in family
trust cases it would treat one spouse as the other's alter ego. 4 Hence
the appointment of a wife or husband as trustee will presumably lie
treated as what it almost invariably is, an empty gesture.
Elias, 41 B. T. A. 1109 (1940), rezd sub nora. Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1941), seems particularly subject to criticism for there the Board stressed as
a reason for decision that the grantor did not declare herself trustee; in reversing. the
court also failed to mention this important reserved power. See also Hormel v. Hel-
vering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941), where the grantor-trustee and his wife could jointly re-
move the co-trustee at any time and choose a successor: White v. Higgin, 116 F. (2d)
312 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), where grantor-trustee had power to remove any co-trustce
without being obliged to name a successor; and Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2di 775
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941), where grantor could remove the trustee at his pleasure.
70. Purdon Smith Whiteley, 42 B. T. A. 316 (1940). Broad povers of management
exercisable without the consent of co-trustees were held insufficient, however, to render
grantor taxable in Commissioner v. Branch, Helvering Y. Palmer, and Kent v. Rothen-
sies, cited supra note 65.
71. See, e.g., Mforton Stein, 41 B. T. A. 994 (1940), where the Board stressed the
grantor-trustee's power to appoint any number of additional co-trustees. Cf. Commis-
sioner v. Branch, 114 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), where a similar power w%-as p-
parently deemed unimportant.
72. 312 U. S. 552 (1941).
73. See p. 220 supra.
74. Identity of interest with the grantor wvas found to exist where the spouse Was
one of two co-trustees possessing power of revocation. R. Douglas Stuart, 42 B. T. A.
1427 (1940), on. appeal C. C. A. 7th. But quarre whether such identity will be found
to exist where the husband-grantor has power to revoke at any time with the consent
of a wife-beneficiary who, traditionally, might be thought to have a "substantial adverse
interest" See Helvering v.'Richter, 312 U. S. 561 (1941), remanded fur specific con-
sideration by the Board of the applicability of § 22(a) contemporaneously with the Ilor-
me! case. Compare David 'M. Heyman. 44 B. T. A. 1009 (1941), with Estate of Wil-
liam Childs, 44 B. T. A. 1191 (1941). For instances where family solidarity between
husband and wife has been disregarded, see Commissioner v. Branch, 114 F. (2d) 935
(C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. .L Ist, 1940)
(gift tax); Commissioner v. Park, 113 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) (deductibility
of interest on note gratuitously given to wife) ; Edna B. Elias, 41 B. T. A. 1109 (1940),
rev'd sub now. Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Helvering v.
Palmer, 115 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (trusts could be amended so as to revest
principal in grantor by written agreement of the trustees, who were the grantor and
his wife, and the adult beneficiaries; but all beneficiaries other than the wife were minors
when the trust was created. See Carleton H. Palmer, 40 B. T. A. 1001 (1939)). In
Estate of Isaac Fish, 42 B. T. A. 260 (1940), a wife-beneficiary was held to have a sub-
stantial adverse interest. The Board later pointed out that this case vas decided four
months after the Clifford case and that the Commissioner acquiesced therein. Estate of
William Childs, 44 B. T. A. 1191 (1941). But the Board seems to have overlooked the
Hormnel case decided after the Commissioner's acquiescence. See also Estate of Frederick
S. Fish, 45 B. T. A. 120 (1941).
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It is submitted that a similarly realistic approach should be used where
a third party is appointed trustee. The Second Circuit has done so in
Commissioner v. Barbour75 where it observed that it was "reasonable
to suppose" that the grantor, who had not reserved any express con-
trol, "felt confident" that his lawyers, whom he had made trustees,
"would observe his reasonable wishes as to investment and manage-
ment." 76  The Board, also, in the McKnight and Bush cases" where
the officers of a company appointed as trustee its Assistant Treasurer,
thought him "no more than a friendly middleman in the family nego-
tiations." A similar conclusion should perhaps have been reached in
the earlier Lamont case 78 where the trustee, settlor's "intimate friend
and attorney," who might, as the Board itself noted, be thought subject
to her influence because of fees to be earned in connection with her
other affairs, was treated as wholly independent. The Board justified
its conclusion by professing inability to draw a line based on considera-
tions of the extent to which a trustee outside of the family group, such
as an ordinary commercial trustee, might be under the influence of its
client-settlor. But the Clifford rule calls for "an analysis of the terms
of the trust and all the circumstances attendant on its creation and
operation."70 Thus, if a bank functioning as trustee is found to have
lent to the grantor without collateral a substantial portion of the assets
of the trust," such compliance with his wishes ought, it is submitted,
to be considered in determining its freedom from influence.8 '
IDENTITY OF THE BENEFICIARIES
The Clifford opinion seemed to place particular emphasis on the fact
that the beneficiaries were members of the grantor's "family group"
and that the trust accomplished a reallocation of income within "an in-
75. 122 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
76. But cf. Jones v. Norris, 122 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941), where the court
disregarded the fact that the trustee was a confidential employee and the grantor had
"exercised autocratic powers over the trust estate."
77. William L. McKnight, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 17271-B (B. T. A. mere);
Archibald G. Bush, 43 B. T. A. 535 (1941).
78. 'Elizabeth K. Lamont, 43 B. T. A. 61 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. 2d.
79. Italics supplied. 309 U. S. 331, 335 (1940).
80. As in Frank E. Wolcott, 42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940).
81. In the Buck case, where a bank was trustee, the Second Circuit flatly asserted
that the Supreme Court's decision in Helvering v. Richter, 312 U. S. 561 (1940), had
removed as a "significant difference" the fact that the grantor was not the trustee. It
is difficult to understand how such a sweeping inference can be drawn from that opinion,
which dealt with a procedural question, especially since the trust company which had
been made trustee could be ousted at any time the grantor and his wife chose to revoke
the trust. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has not yet spoken with regard to an
independent trustee who cannot be ousted either by substitution or by revocation of the
trust.
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timate family group." 2 This concept might reasonably be deemed to
include no more than the grantor's spouse and children, plus, conceivably,
dependent relatives living under his roof. 3 But, strangely enough, in
cases holding the grantor taxable, inclusion among the ranks of the
beneficiaries of a sister for whose support he felt responsible,84 of his
parents,s5 of brothers, sisters, sisters-in-law and cousins,8 has been
passed over sub silentio.s7 Though it is true that in sonic cases where
82. The Board seems to suggest as a criterion whether the relative would he an
heir, should grantor die intestate (see Herbert WV. Hoover, 42 B. T. A. 289, 297 (1940),
on appeal C. C. A. 6th) ; or whether grantor is under any legal duty to support the rela-
tive (see Elizabeth K. Lamont, 43 B. T. A. 61, 66 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. 3d).
Whereas the latter test would be significant in considering the rule of Douglas v. Will-
cuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935), and other cases touching this subject, it seems quite beside
the point here, since the Clifford trust "was not designed to relieve respondent from
liability for family or household expenses." 309 U. S. 331, 333 (1940). That the benefi-
ciaries of a trust are members of the grantor's family is, of itself, not enough to make
the Clifford rule applicable. George H. Deuble, 42 B. T. A. 277 (1940), on appeal C. C.
A. 6th (see the "income" trusts). Two circuit courts seem to regard a family relation-
ship between settlor and cestuis as an indispensable element to invoke applicability of
the rule: Kraft v. Commissioner, 111 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940), cert. denied, 311
U. S. 671 (1940); Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
Certainly, the complete disregard of this factor, as in John P. Wilson, 42 B. T. A. 1260
(1940), on appeal C. C. .4. 7th, would seem just cause for adverse criticism. The Sixth
Circuit, in Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 162 (C. C. A. jth, 1940), cart. denied,
312 U. S. 706 (1941), and in Commissioner v. Central Nat. Bank, 119 F. (2d) 470 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1941), refers to Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940), as giving additional
stress to the "family solidarity" concept. This interpretation seems doubtful since there
the assignor of income was taxed on the theory that by his assignment he pr(aiired a
satisfaction such "'as may result from the payment of a campaign or community chest
contribution, or a gift to his favorite son:' The Horst case is discussed infra p. 240.
83. Cases dealing with the personal exemption available to the head of a family
under § 25(b) (1) of the Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1936 may furnish persuasive analo-
gies. See, e.g., Ellis v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); Wade v.
Helvering, 117 F. (2d) 21 (App. D. C. 1940) ; Claude S. Rucker, 42 B. T. . 32 (1940) ;
Richard H. Baumbach, 42 B. T. A. 88 (1940); Charlotte Hoskins, 42 B. T. A. 117
(1940); Estate of Grace Adams Howard, 42 B. T. A. 449 (1940) ; L. B. Hirsch, 42 B.
T. A. 566 (1940); Percival Parrish, 44 B. T. A. 144 (1941); J. Brooks B. Parker, 44
B. T. A. 369 (1941).
84. Archibald G. Bush, 43 B. T. A. 535 (1941).
85. Reuter v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. Cl. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S.
o95 (1941), Reuter v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 698 tC. C. A. 5th, 1941).
86. First Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 7th, KA40j C .,
v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940), cc.I. deniied, 311 U. S. r07
(1940); both these cases, however, involve reciprocal trusts and may hence be con-
sidered somewhat abnormal.
87. Only the Second Circuit has discussed the point when holding "in the family" a
dependent nephew, though he ,as not a member of settlor's household. Commissioner v.
Woolley, 122 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); and as within the "intimate family
group" a mother-in-law living in another town, the taxpayer having failed to meet the
burden of demonstrating the error of such a shocking presumption. Commissioner v.
Barbour, 122 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
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decision went in his favor, the fact that the beneficiaries were not
members of his immediate family circle has been stressed, it has gone
unmentioned in about as many.85 It seems that the length of the trust
term and the quantum of control reserved by the grantor weigh more
heavily with the Board and the lower courts (except the Second Cir-
cuit89) than degrees of relationship.
The intuition of these tribunals would seem to have been sound for
in Harrison v. Schaffner"° the Supreme Court referred to the Clifford
case as determining taxability to the donor of income which he
"gives away through the medium of a short-term trust created for the
benefit of the donee", i.e., apparently, any donee. Moreover, in Helvering
v. Fuller,9 a case involving a trust created to take care of a wife's
needs after the family group had been shattered by divorce, the Supreme
Court indicated that the all-important- and perhaps, it may be ven-
tured, the solely decisive - factor when considering the applicability of
the Clifford rule was the quantum of control retained by the grantor.
CONTROL
A short-term trust, the appointment of one's self or of a compliant
person as trustee, and the naming of close relatives 'as beneficiaries are
not, as we have seen, rigid limitations beyond which the rule of the
Clifford case is inapplicable. Each of these elements is indicative of
the extent to which the grantor has, realistically speaking, remained
"the owner of the corpus,""3 but all of them are merely examples of
means which may be chosen to keep dominion over trusteed property.
Hence it is important to determine whether the cases have taken a broader
approach and have analyzed the situations presented in order to ascer-
tain not only froni the trust instrument, but also from "all circumstances
88. Remoteness stressed: Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A.
2d, 1941) (educational corporation) ; Lolita S. Armour, 41 B. T. A. 777 (1940) (daugh-
ter who had established own home and family ties) ; Elizabeth K, Lamont, 43 B, T. A.
61 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. 2d, (first cousins, not members of settlor's household);
Dunlevy Milbank, 41 B. T. A. 1014 (1940) (sister-in-law and uncle, not members of
immediate family circle); Jessie W. Donahue, 44 B. T. A. 329 (1941) (deceased hus-
band's brothers and sisters).
Remoteness not mentioned: Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 2d,
1940) (educational corporation); Antoinette K. Brown, 42 B. T. A. 693 (1940), re,'d suib
nom. Commissioner v. Brown, 4 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 9667 (C. C. A. 3d,
1941) (servant and friend) ; Arthur M. Betts, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 17116-D
(B. T. A. mem.) (parent).
89. Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), discussed
supra note 55.
90. 312 U. S. 579 (1941).
91. 310 U. S. 69 (1940).
92. Contra: Reginald B. Parsons, 44 B. T. A. 1142 (1941).
93. Hclvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 334 (1940).
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attendant on [the] creation and operation" 4 of the trust, what econom-
ically significant controls the grantor has retained.
The Clifford opinion singles out control over investment, °  and by
and large the cases give great importance to this factor." Yet a few
opinions have asserted, one with rather cavalier treatment of its reitera-
tion as "the dictum in Hcvcring v. Fuller,"0°7 that retention of broad
powers of management either qua trustee 8 or qua grantor is instffi-
cient reason for taxing the income to the grantor.
The lending of trust corpus by a grantor either to himself or to
enterprises under his control or management has been recognized as a
significant indiciuin of ownership by the Seventh Circuit... and should
be so considered even where the trustee is a third party. The Board
might be criticized for only giving weight to this factor 1 ' where pro-
94. Id. at 335. Such consideration of extrinsic evidence is to be found increasingly
in the cases. Cf. Buhl v. Kavanaugh, 118 F. (2d) 315, 321 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941), in
which the court said that such evidence will be considered only if the written instrument
is uncertain or indefinite in its contents.
95. 309 U. S. 331, 335.
96. See, e.g., Reuter v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. Cl. 1940), cert. denied,
312 U. S. 695 (1941) ; First Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 7th,
1940) ; Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Gcorge H. Deuble,
42 B. T. A. 277 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. 6th; Snowden Fahnestock. 43 B. T. A. 569
(1941) (grantor-trustee's argument that his power of reinvestment was limited by state
law disregarded in view of actual investments made) ; Robert -L Cory, 3 C. C. H. 1941
Fed. Tax Serv. 117272-B (B. T. A. mem.) (distinguishing power to direct investments
from right merely to disapprove those suggested by the trustee). Cf. Frank E. Wolcott,
42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940).
97. Commissioner v. Branch, 114 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), referring to 310
U. S. 69, 76 (1940).
98. Commissioner v. Branch, 114 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Kent v. Roth-
ensies, 35 F. Supp. 291 (E. D. Pa. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 120 F. (2d) 476 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1941); Carleton H. Palmer, 40 B. T. A. 1002 (1939), aff'd on authority of
Branch case sub nora. Helvering v. Palmer, 115 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); John
N. Fulham, 44 B. T. A. 1183 (1941); Frederick Ayer, 3 C. C. I. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv.
117683 (B. T. A.). Reservation of a power merely as trustee may have important tax
consequences. Cf. Terhune v. Welch, 39 F. Supp. 430 (D. Mass. 1941) (estate tax).
99. Jones v. Norris, 122 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) ; Arthur M. Betts, 3 C. C.
H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 7116-D (B. T. A. mem.); Jessie W. Donahue, 44 B. T. A.
329 (1941).
100. First Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940). But
see Kent v. Rothensies, 35 F. Supp. 291 (E. D. Pa. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 120
F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
101. H. S. Richardson, 42 B. T. A. 830 (1940), aff'd sub non. Richardson v. Com-
missioner, 121 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); David If. Heyman, 44 B. T. A. 1069
(1941); see also Estate of William J. Garland, 43 B. T. A. 731 (1941) (decided under
§ 166). But see Edna B. Elias, 41 B. T. A. 1109 (1940), rcv'd sub noin. Helvering v.
Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), where the Board fails to refer to a claue
permitting a husband-trustee to borrow without security up to 80 of the corpus at a
ridiculously low rate of interest; the adverb is used advisedly since the rate .%as 4 , and
the trust was created on July 1, 1929.
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vision for such loans appeared in the trust instrument for if the loans
are actually made during the operation of the trust 0 2 the Clifford
decision commands that they be noticed. Surely such loans, especially
when made without security, indicate substantial retention of control
particularly since, in these family trusts, it is open to question whether
repayment will ever be insisted upon by the cestuis.
Again, the right to vote trusteed stock, coupled with control over
investment and reinvestment, was held by the Board in George H.
Deuble11 3 a "requisite vital" element of control sufficient to bring the
Clifford rule into play although the trust involved lacked many of the
features of the Clifford trust. The Board correctly pointed out that appli-
cability of the rule depended on no one particular factor but on the
aggregate of all factors of control. Naturally, the significance of the
right to vote should also be appraised realistically since it depends upon
the nature of the trust corpus. If the latter consists of relatively small
blocks of stock in large nationally owned corporations, such as General
Motors or Standard Oil of New Jersey, the retention of the right to
vote means little, but if a grantor has trusteed shares of a company
in which he, singly or together with associates or relatives, has a donli-
nant interest, that right assumes quite a different importance.1 ' It
enables him to have, in the words of the Clifford opinion, "rather com-
plete assurance that the trust will not effect any substantial change in
his economic position.'' °
102. As in Frank E. Wolcott, 42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940) (secured and unsecured), and
Lady Marian Bateman, 43 B. T. A. 69 (1940) (grantor obtained loans by appointing
part of corpus as security; Board rejected argument that she could thus secure full eco-
nomic benefits from the corpus).
103. 42 B. T. A. 277 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. 61h.
104. The Second Circuit in Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775, 11. 2 (1941),
noted that the grantor "had expressly in mind the importance of retaining voting power
in a considerable block of stock in conjunction with a small group of persons who, to-
gether with him, were the dominant stockholders." The court drew attention to the fact
"that control of such a block yields corporate control from which in turn may flow
numerous pecuniary emoluments of substance." Cf. Reed, J., dissenting in Helvering v.
Fuller, 310 U. S. 69 (1940). But the statemqnt made in the text should not be applied
blindly. Thus it may be thought that the Board erred when selecting as one of the rea-
sons for holding a grantor not taxable on the income of a family trust his non-retention
of the right to vote, quite disregarding the fact that after trusteeing certain "hares he
still owned more than 50% of the stock. Frank E. Wolcott, 42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940).
Furthermore, the statement of facts clearly demonstrates that he continued to exercise
effective control over the trusteed stock which was disposed of shortly after the trust
was created upon the occasion of the sale of the grantor's business which, almost cer-
tainly, had been arranged by him before the trust was set up. He continued to exercise
control over investments, many of which were in concerns which lie dominated, and also
borrowed quite heavily from the trust. The whole opinion seems to fly in the face of
Mr. Justice Douglas' clarion call for regard for the realities.
105. 309 U. S. 331, 335-36 (1940).
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But complete certainty that the status quo will be preserved requires
the complementary assurance, acquired either by way of express legal
power or through a gentleman's understanding with the trustee, that
the original corpus will remain undisturbed. If this additional factor
is present, then, quoting the Board's language in Frank G. Hoover,'
the grantor:
"does remain in a position to participate in the affairs of the business
in which he is actively interested, a prerogative which proceeds
from the retained equivalent of ownership of his interest in that
enterprise. This is an attribute of proprietorship frequently of
greater significance than the right to receive income."' 011
The belief that there is no substantial change in a grantor's economic
position despite the fact that he is only able to maintain the status quo
of trusteed securities during the period when he has relinquished legal
title thereto is not advanced as anything new. Such considerations may
well have influenced those justices who, although dissenting in Burnet
v. lVells,0 joined the majority in concurring in the alternative ground
for decision in DuPont %. Conynissioner'0 In that case"" Mr. Irenee
DuPont transferred to the Wilmington Trust Company, as trustee,
certain insurance policies on his own life and 830 shares of 7% pre-
ferred stock of the Christiania Securities Company (the well-known
DuPont family holding company)," the income to be used to keep the
policies in force. The trust deed neither specifically prohibited the
trustee from selling the shares nor reserved to the grantor power to
direct such sales, but several provisions dealing with the ultimate dis-
position of the corpus referred only to "the shares", thus clearly indi-
cating an intention that the corpus be not disturbed during the trust
period. Indeed, viewed realistically, it is a little absurd to imagine that
the Wilmington Trust Company would have sold this Christiania pre-
ferred stock except at Ar. DuPont's direction and certainly not without
his consent. The unanimous Supreme Court seems to have regarded
the trust deed as having the effect of "freezing" the corpus for, in ex-
plaining its conclusion that the instrument's provisions require a deter-
mination against the taxpayer, the Court stated that "during a term of
three years, the trustee . . .was to hold the principal htact fur return
to the grantor unless instructed to retain it longer." "1
106. 42 B. T. A. 786 (1940).
107. Id. at 792.
108. 289 U. S. 670 (1933).
109. Id. at 685.
110. These details are taken from the opinions below. DuPont v. Commissioner, 63
F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933), and 20 B. T. A. 4,02 (1930).
111. See MCODY's INDUSTLu.S (1924) 63.
112. Italics supplied. 289 U. S. 6S5, 628-59 (1933).
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A good many of the family trusts considered in post-Clifford cases,
which are composed of stock in corporations closely identified with the
grantor, presumably have the same objective. Indeed, there is more than
a presumption where the grantor in one way or another has reserved
the power to prevent any sale of such securities ostensibly placed in
trust." 3 Even where such power is not reserved,11 4 a realistic approach
would seem to demand the adoption of a rebuttable presumption that
the securities were to be kept intact for the duration of the trust,
Another "very vital incident of ownership""', not present in the
Clifford trust is the retained power to change the beneficiaries of corpus
and income." 6 As Judge Frank has pointed out in the Buck case, where
113. First Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) (family
holding company stock; three relatives created trusts "to retain their family's control" of
the-company); Helvering v. Palmer, 115 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (stock of
Squibb & Co. of which grantor was president) ; Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941) (10,000 shares of Wrigley stock; grantor and a few others were
the dominant stockholders) ; Kent v. Rothensies, 35 F. Supp. 291 (E. D. Pa. 1940), rev'd
on other grounds, 120 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) (stock of Atwater Kent Manu-
facturing Company of which grantor held a majority); Stanley v. Smith, 4 P. 11. 1941
Fed. Tax Serv. fT 62,823 (D. Conn. 1941) (stock of family holding company controlled
by grantor) ; George H. Deuble, 42 B. T. A. 277 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. 6th, (stock
of Climalene Company in the affairs of which grantor was actively interested, trust inl-
strument indicates it is to be retained) ; Herbert W. Hoover, 42 B. T. A. 289 (1940), on
appeal C. C. A. 6th, and Frank G. Hoover, 42 B. T. A. 786 (1940) (preferred atnd
common stocks of the Hoover Company in which both grantors took an active interest) ;
H. S. Richardson, 42 B. T. A. 830 (1940), aff'd sub nonm. Richardson v. Commissioner,
121 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) (stock of personal holding company) ; Archibald G.
Bush, 43 B. T. A. 535 (1941), and William L. McKnight, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax
Serv. IT 7271-B (B. T. A. mem.) (stock of Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Com-
pany of which grantors were directors and, respectively, vice-president and president)
William J. McCormack, 43 B. T. A. 924 (1941) (stock of personal holding company);
Jessie W. Donahue, 44 B. T. A. 329 (1941) (15,000 shares of Woolworth common which
trustee was instructed not to sell). See also Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69 (1940)
(voting stock of Fuller Brush Company of which grantor, the president, owned two
thirds) ; Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941) (Hormel Company stock); Hel-
vering v. Dunning, 118 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) (decided under § 166; Hynson,
Westcott & Dunning, Inc. stock) ; Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 162 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 706 (1941) (decided under § 167; 3,600 common
shares of "a corporation") ; R. Douglas Stuart, 42 B. T. A. 1427 (1940) (decided under
§ 166; stock of Quaker Oats Company of which grantor was vice-president and of which
his brother, who created reciprocal trusts, was president) ; Otto Peterson, 42 B. T. A.
102 (1940),.-appeal dismissed, 117 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) (new stock issued
to women who could not dispose thereof except under restrictions imposed by their male
relatives who were the old stockholders and sole owners and managers of the corpora-
tion).
114. Frank E. Wolcott, 42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940) (stock of Frank E. Wolcott Manu-
facturing Company).
115. Morton Stein, 41 B. T. A. 994, 1000 (1940).
116. Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Commissioner v.
Brown, 4 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 1f 9667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Morton Stcin, 41
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such a power is reserved by the grantor "the incomes of the members
of his family will still be subject to his whims; should any of his family
expend what he receives in a manner displeasing to Buck, or offend
Buck in any way, a few words written by Buck can cut off that hene-
ficiary's portion of the income and, later, a few more can restore it."' iT
This has the welcome ring of common sense, and one may hispe that
the warning of the Clifford case against permitting mere fornlalism toi
obscure the normal consequences of family solidarity and against accept-
ing legalistic concepts of ownership when invoked to cloak household
arrangements may result in further decisions evidencing such a refresh-
ing attitude.
Indeed, it seems that at long last the courts are adnonished to take
judicial notice of matters which have always been within the ken of
even unsophisticated laymen. A few of these suggest themselves. The
usual reason for creating a family trust is the diminution of the grantcor's
surtaxes by the segregation of part of his property. But the normally
prudent grantor, who realizes that family solidarity may be weakened
by the development of opposing points of view between parent and child,
and perhaps even between husband and wife, does not place the bulk
of his property in trust; he retains more than he segregates. Therefore,
he keeps the whip hand since his wife and children still depend on his
pleasure as to the largest part of their prospective inheritance. Thus,
even disregarding the effect of ties of blood and affection, it is contrary
to normal human conduct to assume that the beneficiaries of a family
trust will use the income which they receive contrary to the grantor's
desires, that they will seek the protection of the courts if the grantor
abuses such powers as he may have retained in an ostensibly fiduciary
capacity, or that they will refuse to exercise powers granted them when-
ever the grantor so requests. LUndoubtedly, the introduction of the
phrase "substantial adverse interest" into Sections 166 and 167 of the
Revenue Act is largely responsible for an unrealistic approach to this
question, since in determining whether such an interest exists the courts
have limited themselves to a consideration of that part of the grantor's
property in the trust sub judice. It is submitted that an analysis of all
B. T. A. 994 (1940). Such reserved powers habitually exclude a diversiun of corpus
or income to the grantor himself in order to escape the impact of §4 165 and 10. Sce
note 1 supra. The fact that retention of such a power does not render trust income tax-
able to the grantor under § 166 [Knapp v. Hoey, 104 F. (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939 ] is
immaterial when construing § 22(a). Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A.
2d, 1941). Similarly, where management of corpus is coupled with the right to dispose
thereof by will, the Clifford rule has been held applicable: Reginald B. Parsons, 44 B.
T. A. 1142 (1941) ; but not where only the latter power is present: Lady Marian Bate-
man, 43 B. T. A. 69 (1940), on appeal . C. .1. Ist. Walter S. Halliwell, 44 U. T. A.
740 (1941); Mary W. Pingree, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 1,76I (B. T. A.).
117. 120 F. (2d) 775, 778 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
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the circumstances attendant on the creation of a family trust, such as
the Clifford opinion calls for, should include consideration of the
grantor's total wealth and that the courts and the Board should deem
absence of any adverse interest in the beneficiaries of such a trust a
rebuttable presumption." 8 Furthermore, the possibility of the invocation
of the powers of equity should similarly be considered against the back-
ground of these realities."o
Some courts have used the Clifford rationale when considering such
issues. Thus in White v. Higgins 1 °2 0 and Cox v. Commissioner,'12 both
decided under Section 22(a), it was deemed highly improbable that a
beneficiary of a family trust would ever resort to equity to restrain
the discretion of the donor. The latter case also indulged in the reason-
able assumption that, in view of the donor's broad reserved powers and
the family relation, a trust beneficiary with a traditionally "substantial
adverse interest" would freely give his consent to revocation of
the trust. Other cases such as Fulham v. Commissioner1 2 and Alt-
maier v. Commissioner,12 3 involving a determination of the existence of
a "substantial adverse interest" within the meaning of Sections 166 or
167 or of the likelihood of resort to equity, have also adopted what may
be termed the Clifford approach. 2  But in Commissioner v. Prouty,'"
a gift tax case, the First Circuit, although paying lip service to the
realism demanded by the Clifford opinion, came to the conclusion that
a husband's chances of surviving his wife with the consequent "chance
to control the disposition of the entire corpus of a large estate" gave
him a "substantial adverse interest."'12  It observed that the prospect
of acquiring such a power of appointment would furnish a far from
negligible pecuniary motive tending to induce the husband to stand out
118. Legislation providing that no "substantial adverse interest" shall be deemed to
exist in a member of the grantor's family has been suggested. Ray, supra note 14, at
1358. This would seem in line with the statutory tendency to tax family units as affiliated
groups of persons exemplified by § 24(a)(6) of the 1934 Act prohibiting the deduction
of intra-family losses.
119. Rollins v. Helvering, 92 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937). Cf. Commissioner
v. O'Keeffe, 118 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941); Lolita S. Armour, 41 B. T. A. 777
(1940); Ray, supra note 14, at 1356.
120. 116 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
121. 110 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. bo/ (1940).
122. 110 F. (2d) 916 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
123. 116 F. (2d) 162 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 706 (1941).
124. See also R. Douglas Stuart, 42 B. T. A. 1421 (1940).
125. 115 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
126. It is true that the husband, if he survived, would also gain discretionary power
to invade the corpus for his own maintenance, support and welfare. But curiously enough
the court pays scarcely any attention to this factor and for its decision in finding a "sub-
stantial adverse interest" relies almost entirely on the rather odd reasoning mentioned in
the text.
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against any desire of the wife-grantor to revoke the trust. This, it is
submitted, is false realism.1 17 Is it likely that Mr. Prouty would auction
off the exercise of his power of appointment to the highest bidder among
possible beneficiaries? The suggestion is preposterous, but how other-
wise can the phrase "a pecuniary motive" be interpreted? The court
conceded that the case was "on the border line" but stated that it could
not be persuaded, in view of the aggregate of the husband's interests,
that the Board had erred in its conclusion that he had a "substantial
adverse interest."' 2S
INTERRELATION OF GiFT AND INCOME TAX
In the few cases which have raised the issue courts have differed in
their willingness to extend the effects of the Clifford rule to the gift tax
field. In Commissioner v. Prouty -12 9 the question was whether a transfer
in trust became a completed gift in 1931 (no gift tax being then in
effect) when the settlor modified her power of revocation and amendment
by making it dependent on the consent of her husband, or in 1935
when she finally relinquished all reserved power. If the husband had
a "substantial adverse interest" the grantor gave up her unfettered power
in 1931 rendering the gift complete in that year. Ve have seen that
the court refused to accept the Government's argument that his interest
was not substantial. But the Commissioner also argued that, regardless
of any such interest in the husband, Mrs. Prouty in 1931 retained so
127. Some judges doubt whether the "realities" can be determined objectively. Thus,
judge Goodrich has said: "Our problem is to appraise the trust instrument against a
background of realities to determine whether the grantor retained 'the controlling hand
over something he has seemed to give away.' . . . The issue is uf the type, not un-
familiar in the law, where the distinctions are not black and white, but of varying shades
of gray and where the shade chosen by the court will seem 'realistic' tu him whose side
wins and artificial or fanciful to the other." Commissioner v. Dravo, 119 F. (2d) 97, 9'9
(C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
128. Perhaps the key to this decision lies in the increasing unwillingness of appellate
tribunals to interfere with conclusions, however styled (i.e., as "findings of ultimate fact"
or "'conclusions involving a mixed question of fact and law." See PAU., FLEr .L EST.T
AND GiFT TAXATION (1941) § 14.22) reached by administrative boards or commissions.
It may be noted that the Cox, Fulham and Ainaicr decisions, \hich regarded tie
adverse interests involved as illusory, also represent affirmances by the Board.
Note, however, the suggestion that in tax cases the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Treasury Department, rather than the Board, should be considered the "expert adminis-
trative agency." Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775, 779, n. 4 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
This contention, with reference to the determination of the ownership of trust corpus,
was advanced by the Government in the Clifford case. Nash, supra note 14, at 194, n.
149. Judge Frank's suggestion as to the role of the Board seems at variance with Mr.
Justice Brandeis', set forth in Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S.
551, 562-65 (1928).
129. 115 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
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large a "bundle of rights and powers" that she remained the owner
of the corpus and taxable on its income under the Clifford doctrine, and
that a gift regarded as incomplete for income tax purposes should be
similarly regarded for purposes of the gift tax. The court, doubting the
applicability of the Clifford rule to the income of this particular trust,
declared that gift and income taxes were not so closely integrated as to
require a holding that no gift tax was payable oil the creation of a trust,
because under the Clifford rule the grantor remained taxable oil its
income. Yet it seemed dissatisfied with this conclusion for it "frankly
recognized" that the interrelation of various taxes presented puzzling
problems worthy of legislative attention. 30
It is submitted that not only fairness to the taxpayer but logical
symmetry as well demand that no gift tax be exacted on a transfer
so incomplete as to leave the transferor for income tax purposes owner
of the corpus. The Government should not be permitted to eat its cake
and have it too. The Clifford concept of ownership should be considered
when determining whether a transfer is sufficiently complete to render
it subject to gift tax and a decision on that issue should be deemed res
judicata on the question of the income tax liability of the transferor.
Conversely, if a court decides that the income of incompletely transferred
property remains taxable to the donor, even though it is actually paid
to another, then the donor should be deemed to remain owner of the
property for purposes of future gift or estate taxation,
Although such integration of the several taxes was refused by the
Board in Ellsworth B. Buck 3' and in Estate of Giles W. Mead, '" both
decided before the Clifford case, the Second Circuit has, subsequently
to the Clifford decision, evidenced a tendency toward harmonization.
In the Buck case the Board, relying primarily onl the Second Circuit's
decision in Knapp v. Hoey,'33 had held that a reserved non-beneficial 131
power to change the beneficiaries of trust corpus or income did not
under Sections 22(a), 166 or 167 render that income taxable to the
settlor. The dissent had urged that harmonious application of the several
sections of the Revenue Act required a contrary holding, because under
Supreme Court decisions reservation of such a power precludes the
transfer from being regarded as a complete gift subject to gift tax'
130. Similarly, Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 591 (C. C. A. 2d, 141), as to
the gift and estate taxes. See Warren, Correlation of Gift and Estate Taxes (1041) 55
HARV. L. RFV. 1.
131. 41 B. T. A. 99 (1940).
132. 41 B. T. A. 424 (1940). See (1941) 54 HARv. L. Riw. 892.
133. 104 F- (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
134. That is, a power which cannot be exercised for the benefit of the grantor or his
estate. Possession of such a power would bring §§ 166 and 167 into play.
135. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (1939).
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and keeps the property within the ambit of the estate tax.136 In the
Mead case the Board held (1) that the gift became complete and sub-
ject to gift tax when the power to clange beneficiaries was abandoned,
but (2) that prior payments of trust income were not gifts froni
the settlor-donor to the beneficiary (and hence not subject to gift tax)
because under Knapp v. Hoey such income was not taxable to the settlor.
If the latter was not regarded for tax purposes as having received the
income, how, inquired the majority, could he be said to have made a
gift thereof to the beneficiary? The dissent, again restating the argu-
ments it had advanced in the Buck case, continued to regard taxation
of the income to the settlor under these circumstances as a necessary
corollary to the propositions laid down by the Supreme Court with
respect to the incidence of the gift and estate taxes. The Sectnd Circuit,
leaning heavily on the Clifford and Horst opinions, reversed' the Board's
decision in the Buck case with regard to the donor's taxability on trust
income. While conceding that the court was bound by Knapp -'. Hoey
with respect to the application of Sections 166 and 167, it deemed that
case of no assistance when construing Section 22(a). It would seem
to follow that the payments of trust income discussed in the Mead case
should likewise be considered for purposes of taxation as having been
received by the settlor and hence the subject of a gift from him to the
beneficiary. Hence the Board's decision in the Mead case would no
longer seem to be good law. And so the recent interpretation of Section
22(a) has done yeoman service in straightening out at least soime .f
the tangled interrelations between gift and income taxes. z
ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME CAsl-s
As stated at the beginning of this article, the Supreme Court during
its recent terms did not restrict the interpretation of Section 22(a) to
deflection-of-income situations involving the creation of certain types
of trusts. In the Horst, Eubank and Schaffner decisions, it also greatly
136. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436 (1933). The renunciation of such a
power will consummate the transfer which will at that time become subject to gift tax.
But since the donor has thereby divested himself of the property completely, no estate
tax will be due barring some peculiar circumstance such as a renunciation made in
contemplation of death.
137. Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (1941).
138. This vexatious subject, however, may be expected to plague all parties until the
Supreme Court speaks. E.g.. it is quite conceivable that the income of the "second trust"
discussed in Welch v. Paine, 120 F. (2d) 141, 144 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941), shtuhld L"!
deemed taxable to the settlor-trustee because of his reserved control over its dispo.ition;
yet all parties concerned in that case assumed that gifts had been nmade and the only
issue presented to the court was the proper calculation of the taxable "net gifts."
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limited the types of assignments available for decreasing the assignor's
taxable income.'3 9
In Lucas v. Earl4 and Burnet v. Leininger,14' decided about a decade
ago, assignments of future income had been held taxable to the assignor,
but in both of these cases, involving respectively the assignor's salary
and his income from a partnership, prospective earnings had been the
subject of the assignments. But when cases arose where receipt of income
assigned did not depend upon "continued activities of the transferor,"t"-
such as doing work which entitled him to receive the salary or getting
the business on which partnership profits depended, there was conflict
in the decisions. Though the Second Circuit,143 ultimately followed by
the Sixth,' adopted the theory that assigned income remained taxable
to the assignor only when its receipt was conditioned on his continued
efforts, several other circuits held assigned future income taxable to
the assignor even where his right to receive it had become irrevocably
fixed prior to the time of assignment. 5
This conflict was resolved in Helvering v. Horst'4 where a gift by a
donor on the cash receipts basis of detached interest coupons, delivered to
the donee during the donor's taxable year and later in the same year paid
at maturity, was held to constitute realization of income by the donor
taxable within Section 22(a). The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
139. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S.
122 (1940) ; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941). In these cases the subject
matter of the transfer or gift was not the property which produced the income, but the
income itself. That there is no clear-cut distinction between the two situations is evi-
denced by the fact that in many cases the Government has argued that the settlor of a
trust should be held taxable both because of retained control over corpus and because his
transfer in trust was in effect a mere assignment of future income. See, e.g., Elizabeth
K. Lamont, 43 B. T. A. 61 (1940); Dunlevy T. Milbank, 41 B. T. A. 1014 (1940); Jes-
sie W. Donahue, 44 B. T. A. 329 (1941); Mary W. Pingree, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax
Serv. f 7660 (B. T. A.) ; and the Government's briefs, filed in Commissioner v. Branch,
114 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) ; Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940); Commissioner v. Richter, 114 F. (2d) 452 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940). See also
PAUL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 273, n. 365.
140. 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
141. 285 U. S. 136 (1932).
142. Shanley v. Bowers, 81 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
143. See, e.g., Lowery v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Rossmoore
v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Matchette v. Helvering, 81 F.
(2d) 73 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
144. Commissioner v. Ross, 83 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936). See also Hall v.
Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 552 (1932).
145. Parker v. Routzahn, 56 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932), cert, denied, 287 U. S.
606 (1932) ; Bishop v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) ; Van Meter
v. Commissioner, 61 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
146. 311 U. S. 112 (1940). Followed in Reginald B. Parsons, 44 B. T. A. 1142
(1941). See (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 340, (1941) 39 Micii. L. REV. 495, (1940) 18 TEXAS
L. REv. 478, (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 532, (1941) 27 VA. L. Rv. 394, (1941) 19
TEXAS L. REv. 489. See Van Sciver v. Rothensies, 122 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
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Stone, stated that an owner of bonds acquired an economic gain when
he obtained the legal right to demand payment of interest and the power
to command its payment to others. But, the Court continued, not all
economic gain is taxable income; "realization" of income, rather than
the acquisition of the right to receive it, has always been deemed the
taxable event under the revenue laws. And "realization" is usually not
deemed to occur until income is paid. But receipt in cash or property has
never been held the only manner in which a taxpayer even on the cash
receipts basis (as 2%1r. Horst was) can realize income. Realization may
occur "when the last step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of
the economic gain which has already accrued to lim."1147 The taxpayer's
enjoyment of the income may be consummated by some event such as
making "such use or disposition of his power to receive or control
the income as to procure in its place other satisfactions which are of
economic worth."' 148 It has long been held, as the Court pointed out,
that if a taxpayer procures payment of income directly to his creditors,
he does not escape taxation because he did not actually receive the
money.149 Similarly, Section 166 prevents such escape if lie sets up a
revocable trust with income payable to the objects of his bounty.1"' In
these situations the Court has held that it makes no difference whether
the taxpayer collects the fruits of his labor or investment and uses them
to procure the satisfaction of his desires, or whether he achieves the
same result by disposing of his right to collect such income. The Court
then applied this reasoning to the case before it and pointed out that
although Mr. Horst by transferring the coupons precluded any possi-
bility of collecting them himself, he nevertheless procured payment of the
interest as a valuable gift to a member of his family. Such procuring of
a satisfaction obtainable only by the expenditure of money or property,
the Court continued:
"would seem to be the enjoynent of the income whether the satis-
faction is the purchase of goods at the corner grocers', the payment
of his debt there, or such non-material satisfactions as may result
from the payment of a campaign or community chest contribution,
or a gift to his favorite son. . . The enjoynent of the economic
benefit accruing to him by virtue of his acquisition of the coupons
is realized as completely as it would have been if he had collected
the intcrcst in dollars and cxpendcd thcm for any of the purposes
named." '51
147. 311 U. S. 112, 115 (1940).
148. Id. at 116.
149. Citing Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (1929); Bowers
v. Kerbaugh-Empre Co., 271 U. S. 170 (1926); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,
284 U. S. 1 (1931).
150. Citing Corliss v. Bowers, 231 U. S. 376 (1930).
151. 311 U. S. 112, 117 (1940).
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The latter part of this reasoning seems to speak on the conceptual plane
of constructive receipt, which imports actual payment of the income to
the taxpayer's designee. Such a theory seems preferable to the one
which may, perhaps, be inferred from other parts of the opinion, namely,
that the exercise of the power to dispose of the income, the act of assign-
ing it, is "the last step . . . taken by which he obtains the fruition of
the economic gain which has already accrued to him."15 2 Mr. -Iorst
presumably experienced "such non-material satisfaction as may result
from . . . a gift to his favorite son" from the moment when he
presented his offspring with the coupons. Yet this disposition of income
which is payable in the future clearly is not the event which caused the
incidence of the tax. For if the obligor should unexpectedly default
on the interest it is hardly conceivable that the Government would seek
to collect an income tax from the assignor. Of course, it may be said
that in such a case the "non-material satisfaction" was wholly illusory
and hence should be disregarded. But does this rationalization comport
with the realities? Suppose that in January a fond parent assigned
to his favorite son a note due in the following December from a wholly
solvent obligor who, however, had become hopelessly insolvent by the
time the due date rolled around; and suppose further that the parent
died a month after making the assignment. Obviously the quantum of
"non-material satisfaction" he experienced under these circumstances was
not affected in the slightest degree by the fact that the son never realized
on the note.'53
The Court also held that the taxpayer's reliance on Blair v. Commis-
sioner 154 was not well taken. In that case, involving an assignment of
a share of the life interest in a certain trust, the Court regarded the
152. Id. at 115. Indeed, the Government so argued in Annie A. Colby, 3 C. C. I-1.
1941 Fed. Tax Serv. f 7741 (B. T. A.).
153. Of course, cases where the assignments were made years before the income was
received, such as the Earl and Eubank cases, show that the assignor's tax liability does
not accrue until the year when the income is actually paid. But it is submitted that it
is not alone the exercise of the power to dispose of income which consummates the as-
signor's enjoyment and that "realization" does not occur when he takes "the last step
by which he obtains the fruition of the economic gain which has already acerued
to him." Resulting payment to the donee (or, at any rate, to some one, for conceivably
the donee may have made a reassignment) is an indispensable factor. This is clearly
stated later in the Horst opinion where the Court says that whether or not the rendition
of services by the assignor is required to make the assignment effective (as in the Earl
and Leininger cases) "it is the exercise of the power of disposition of the interest or
compensation with the resulting payment to the donce which is the enjoyment by the
donor of income derived from them." (italics supplied). Because of the mentioned difficul-
ties inherent in the concept of a "non-material satisfaction" it seems more satisfactory to
think in terms of constructive receipt when seeking to state a wholly convincing rationale
for the decision.
154. 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
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right to income from the trust property as so identified with the equit-
able ownership that it viewed the transaction as an outright gift of
income-producing property rather than as an assignment of income. In
the Horst opinion the Court eoxplains:
"Unlike income . . . derived from an obligation to pay interest
or compensation, the income of the trust was regarded as no more
the income of the donor than would be the rent from a lease or a
crop raised on a farm after the leasehold or the farm had been
given away.' ' 5
When such an analogy is used to buttress a distinction which spells a
property interest out of a right to receive trust income and thereby
attaches different tax consequences to an assignment of such income
than to assignments of rights to receive interest or salary or commissions,
the Court may be regarded once again as placing reliance on "attenuated
subtleties" or "niceties of the law of trusts" held of no consequence in
the Earl and Clifford cases for purposes of the revenue laws.
It may be that the patent artificiality of this distinction caused Mr.
Chief Justice Groner, when concurring in Huber v. Helvering,tO to
disregard its restatement in the Horst opinion and to conclude that
the Horst case and its companion, Helvering v. Eubank, T had made
the rule in the Blair case no longer controlling. The majority in the
Huber decision, however, took a contrary view and, when considering
an assignment made by a person entitled, during his life, to receive
income from a trust, found a significant distinction between an assign-
ment of part of such income for all of the assignor's life (the Blair
situation) and one of all of such income for a limited period of time
(one year in the Huber case). In the latter situation the assignor was
held not to have given up any of the property or estate from which he
derived income since "his reversionary interest is much greater than the
interest the assignee received." ''
That the majority was right in treating the rule in the Blair case as
a factor still to be reckoned with was soon confirmed when the Supreme
Court decided Harrison v. Schaffizr,"' the final important decision at
its last term involving Section 22 (a). This case involved an anticipatory
155. 311 U. S. 112, 119 (1940).
156. 117 F. (2d) 782 (App. D. C. 1941).
157. 311 U. S. 122 (1940) (assignment of fully earned rene al commissions). Fol-
lowed in Helvering v. Knapp, 121 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Francis T. Whit-
worth, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 7606-C (B. T. A. mere.); Duran v. Commis-
sioner, 4 P. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. f[ 62,982 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
158. For a somewhat analogous balancing of the quantum of the estate of a rever-
sioner against that of a trust beneficiary, see Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (24) 171 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1941).
159. 312 U. S. 579 (1941). See (1941) 54 HAw\'. L. R V. 1405, (1941) 50 Y=uz
L. J. 512.
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assignment of trust income held taxable by the court below to the as-
signee. The Court stated the issue to be whether, in the light of its
opinions in the Horst and Eubank cases, it made any difference in the
application of the revenue law that the gift was effected by such an
assignment rather than by one of "interest, dividends, rents and the,
like which are payable to the donor."' 60 But despite this auspicious
keynote the Court contented itself with avoiding the taxpayer's reliance
on the Blair case by again distinguishing it as "a transfer in praesceti
to the donee, of a life interest in the corpus of the trust property." 10'
The Schaffner case, however, was regarded by the Court to present
quite a different situation since it involved annual assignments made late
in 1929 and 1930 of specified amounts of the net income of a trust for
the respective subsequent years. Such gifts by a beneficiary of some
part of his income derived from trust property "for the period of a
day, a month or a year" were:
"no such substantial disposition of the trust property as to
camouflage the reality that he is enjoying the benefit of the income
from the trust of which he continues to be the beneficiary, quite
as much as he enjoys the benefit of interest or wages which he gives
away as in the H-orst and Eubank cases."' 6 2
This passage seems confusing. Does it mean that Mrs. Schaffner was
deemed to enjoy the benefit of the trust income through the procuring
of a "non-material satisfaction" because she did not make substantial
disposition of the trust property? This can hardly be so, since the satis-
faction arises from the disposition of future income to obtain some-
thing not otherwise procurable except by the expenditure of money or
money's worth; thus disposition or retention of the income-producing
property seems immaterial to the applicability of the "satisfaction"
theory. To illustrate, Mr. Horst kept his property; Mrs. Schaffner was
deemed by the Court not to have disposed of hers in any substantial
way; and Mr. Eubank never had any income-producing property of
which to dispose. For although Eubank assigned all "right, title and
interest ' 63 in the contract covering his insurance renewal commissions,
the Court did not mention the assignment of the contract which, there-
fore, presumably was not considered as "property" distinguishable from
the right to income conveyed by the assignment. Eubank assigned every-
thing he could assign; Blair assigned only part of his future income.
If the former is taxed because by the exercise of his power to command
160. 312 U. S. 579, 580 (1941).
161. Id. at 582.
162. Ibid.
163. See Eubank v. Commissioner, 117 F. (2d) 737 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). See (1940)
53 HAv. L. Rsv. 1398.
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the income he enjoys the benefit thereof, it seems unrealistic not to tax
the latter for the same reason.
In the Schaffner opinion, however, the Court professed not to be
troubled by the logical difficulties of drawing the line between a gift of an
equitable interest in property for life effected by a gift for life of a share
of the income of a trust and the gift of such income or a part of it for
the period of a year. But since, on the one hand, a gift measured by the
donor's life may be for thirty days or twenty years and, on the other, the
Court would undoubtedly deem the Sclaffner case controlling if the as-
signment were of two, five or even ten years' income,1"- from a practical
point of view the divergent tax results seem quite unjustifiable. Suppose
that a taxpayer's grandfather created a trust naming him sole beneficiary
during the four year period when he might be expected to need the income
for his college education, the trust instrument, however, containing no
restriction on use of the income. Because of family financial reverses
the beneficiary decides to forego a higher education, and assigns all
his interest to his widowed mother. How, logically, can the applic-
ability of the rule of the Blair case be denied? Will the Court seek
to distinguish between the equitable interest in trust property held by
a life tenant and a tenant for a term of years? To draw such dis-
tinctions, it is submitted, is wholly out of harmony with the Court's
present approach to tax questions.
It should be noted that in the Schafftcr case, the Court relied not
only on the "satisfaction" theory of the Horst and Eubank cases, but
added:
"Even though the gift of income be in form accomplished by the
temporary disposition of the donor's property which produces the
income, the donor retaining every oilier substantial interest in it,
we have not allowed the form to obscure the reality. Income
which the donor gives away through the medium of a short term
trust created for the benefit of the donee is nevertheless income
taxable to the donor [citing the Clifford and Hormel cases]. We
perceive no difference, so far as the construction and application
of the Revenue Act is concerned, between a gift of income in a
specified amount by the creation of a trust for a year, see Hormel
v. Helvering, and the assignment by the beneficiary of a trust
already created of a like amount from its income for a year."' "0
This passage demonstrates the close affinity betveen cases where
income is deflected through the medium of a trust and by means of
an assignment. In the latter situation, the time factor, borrowed from
164. This assumption seems justified because the Court found no difficulty in deem-
ing the rationale of the Clifford case, which involved a short-term trust, very possibly
applicable to the ten-year trust of the Fuller case.
165. 312 U. S. 579, 583 (1941).
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the trust cases, is seized upon to furnish an analogy. There are already
some lower court decisions where the power-of-disposal-over-income and
the "satisfaction" concepts of the assignment cases have been used, more
or less aptly, to justify taxation of income to grantors of trusts. In
Whiteley v. Comnissioner'00 the settlor of certain trusts set up for his
minor children was taxed on the income which he could have demanded
of the trustee but only to apply to his children's support. The fact that
he did not do so but left the money with the trustee for reinvestment
was deemed immaterial by the court'0 7 which maintained that "lie con-
trolled the use of the money and had the same non-material satisfaction
as that of the taxpayer in the Horst case."'"8 But the Horst case seems
merely to hold that exercise of the power of assigning income results
in a "non-material satisfaction" which otherwise could have been ob-
tained only by the expenditure of money or money's worth. In the
Whiteley case the taxpayer had long since parted with the income-
producing property placed in the trust; he had made his expenditure
of money or money's worth at that time. Should the income remain
taxable to him solely because he retains the option of determining whether
it shall be accumulated or spent for the benefit of the beneficiaries? If
under the trust instrument there were no such option and the only use
to which the income could be put were reinvestment by the trustee, clearly
the settlor would not be taxable on any theory of "non-material satis-
faction." Can he be deemed to have experienced such satisfaction when
the trustee made the reinvestments, merely because he could have diverted
the flow of the money? Possibly his rather limited control over the
income may be a basis for taxing it to him. But it is submitted that
the latent power of control and the enjoyment of a "non-material satis-
faction" are not one and the same thing.
Another instance of the application of the rationale of the assign-
ment cases to a trust income situation is found in Commissioner v.
Buck. '9 There, the settlor had reserved the right to reallocate income
to any one except himself; the Second Circuit held such power highly
important in determining his taxability inasmuch as the Horst and
Schaffner cases had declared that the donor's power to dispose of in-
come "is the equivalent of ownership of it." And in Mairs v. Reynolds 0
the rationale of the Horst and Eubank cases, i.e., procuring and enjoy-
166. 120 F. (2d) 782 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
167. See also David M. Heyman, 44 B. T. A. 1009 (1941), where the Board said:
"the possession of the power is determinative, not the fortuitous manner of its use." But
cf. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 121 F. (2d) 307 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) (estate
tax; non-exercise of power of appointment).
168. 120 F. (2d) 782, 785 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
169. 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
170. 120 F. (2d) 857 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
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ing an economic benefit of the income, was adopted as an alternative
ground for holding taxable to the settlor trust income applied to the
education of his children. This process of cross-fertilization may be
expected to continue. 1
171. Yet it should be observed that the power to dispuse of income in an assignment
case and the continuing power to reallocate trust income are not quite the same thing.
Anyone who has an unfettered legal right to receive income has the power of assigning
it, but it is the exercise of the power which raises the question involved in the Horst,
Eubank and Schaffner cases. On the other hand, in the trust cases the mere existence
of the power of reallocation, whether exercised or not, is under the Buc: decision suffi-
cient reason for taxing the grantor. This distinction may seem immaterial. Assume that
A has a right to receive interest on X bonds and on Y bonds. He assigns the interest on
the former as in the Horst case and places the latter in a trust similar to that created
by Mr. Buck. Both amounts of income remain taxable to him, although in the former
case he has irrevocably exercised his power of disposal of the income and in the latter
has retained a continuing power to shift the income hither and yon. But suppose that A,
in contemplation of a trip to the wilds of Tibet which may isolate him for ten years,
wishes to provide against the radical diminution of his income which, he fears, may be
brought about by tax increases during his absence. His wife is wealthy in her on
right, which precludes her as donee or beneficiary of income. His thoughts, therefore,
turn to his adult children. Yet he desires that during his absence she retain power
over allocation of the income which he is willing to deflect, should the occasion arise,
since he deems it wise that the mother should have some check on whatever spendthrift
proclivities the children may develop. So he transfers to her power for ten years to
assign the interest from the X bonds to whomsoever she chooses, excluding herself, and
places the Y bonds in a ten-year trust, naming an independent trustee with full powers
of management, with income payable in equal shares to his children but with power in
the wife to reallocate the income to any one, excluding herself. Assume further that,.
contrary to A's gloomy foreb.Aings, taxes are not raised, the children conduct them-
selves faultlessly and, consequently, the wife never exercises either power. Whu is tax-
able during the ten years? A continues to receive the income on his X bnds; surely
it will continue to be taxed to him since a transfer of the power of assignment would not
be countenanced as a device to shift tax incidence. With regard, however, to the power
to reallocate trust income, might not a different result follow? A has reserved no powers
of any kind and a term of ten years is hardly of such short duration as to call fur the
conclusion, in the words of the Buch case, that "the control factor is sufficiently preent."
Indeed, the Second Circuit has recently so held in Commissioner v. Jonas, 122 F. (2d)
169 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). Therefore, the Clifford rule would hardly be applicable to
him. But Mrs. A now has that very vital incident of ownership, almost unlimited power
to dispose of the income as she chooses. Should the tax nut fall on her rather than twl
the clildren whose continued receipt of income is wholly dependent on her w"him? If so,
she would be taxable on the trust income whether or nut she exercised her puwer. As
to the income which she may assign, clearly she would become taxable thereon if and
when she exercised her power and assigned the same, let us sufliuse, to some pet charity
because in so doing she would realize that "non-material satisfaction" which, as the lorst
case teaches, she could otherwise procure only by the expenditure of moneLy or mney's
worth.
"The term 'benefit', which occurs in many of the deflection of income cases dis-
cussed above, is also sometimes loosely used when translated from one topinitn to an-
other without precise regard for its various connotations. Compare the types of "benefit"
discussed in the Clifford case with those adverted to in the Hurst and lIuber cases, in
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it seems quite clear that the Supreme Court and the
lower tribunals have travelled far beyond the limits which an optimistic
taxpayer might have thought indicated by the Clifford opinion. There
the Court stated that the settlor "has rather complete assurance that
the trust will not effect any substantial change in his economic posi-
tion." 72 This conclusion was based on the short term of the trust, the
fact that the income remained within settlor's family and the fact that the
settlor retained control over investment. Will the absence of any of these
factors aid the taxpayer? Apparently not. The Fuller dictum indicates
and the Second Circuit's opinion in the Buck case expressly states that the
settlor of a trust of long duration may be taxable, if he has retained
sufficient control over the corpus or even over the disposition of the
income."' The Supreme Court's summary in the Schaffner opinion of its
holding in the Clifford case omits all mention of the familial relationship.
Furthermore, since in the assignment cases the identity of the donee is
a matter of no consequence whatsoever, is it not oversanguine to an-
ticipate that the Supreme Court would exempt the settlor of a trust
merely because the beneficiary is not a relative ?174 Would it not lend
a sympathetic ear to an argument such as the Government made in
Helvering v. Achelis,"' which ran:
"It is true that in the Clifford case the beneficiary was the wife
of the grantor . . ., while in the instant case the beneficiary ap-
pears to have been a charitable or educational corporation ...
But if, as we believe, an underlying reason for stressing the family
relationship in these cases is that the courts will not countenance
an arrangement whereby the taxpayer seeks to obtain indirectly
a deduction for personal, living or family expenses to which he is
not entitled under the law, then, surely, there is an equally cogent
reason for the disapproval of cases where the taxpayer may seek
to obtain by indirection a deduction for contributions in excess of
the amount permitted by law. Looking at the situation realisti-
cally, there seems to be no ground for distinguishing cases where
the gift is made to a member of the grantor's family, a charity or
Estate of William J. Garland, 43 B. T. A. 731 (1941), and in Margaret R. Phipps, 43
B. T. A. 324 (1940). Perhaps a meticulous distinction between these different sorts of
benefits is unimportant, since all of them result in taxation of the person benefited. An
outstanding authority in the tax field has observed that the concept of 'benefit' is subtly
entwined with that of 'dominion and control'. PAUL, op. cit. supra note 128, §§ 1.08
and 1.12."
172. 309 U. S. 331, 335-36.
173. See also Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
174. This opinion is hazarded despite the Second Circuit's contrary holding in Com-
missioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F. (2d) 765 (1941).
175. 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
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a stranger, provided, of course, the grantor may fairly be con-
sidered the owner of the trust properties."1I0
Finally, as indicated above, non-retention of control over corpus will
not help where control over the disposition of the income has been
reserved.
Such a reservation is fatal since, in the words of the Horst case, "the
power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it." Another
single factor which apparently will render the settlor taxable is the
short duration of a trust with reversion to the grantor, even if there
are no express reservations of control. The Second Circuit has said
in the Buck case that the brevity of the term in and of itself imports
control. 7 A third single factor, which may prove fatal and on which
the dictum in the Fuller case places sole emphasis, would seem to be
retained control over the corpus itself.
Assuming that a man of property creates a 25-year trust, with income
irrevocably payable to the Republican Party, and with no control of
any sort reserved over the corpus, would the Court allow him to escape
taxation on the trust income where, under its decisions to date, the
same man would be taxable on renewal commissions payable to him for
the next 25 years even though he had irrevocably assigned them to the
GOP? It is hardly likely that any such situation will ever come before
the Court for adjudication, but the prediction is ventured that the taxa-
tion of trust income to the settlor"7 ' will be analogized more and more
to the taxation of assigned income to the assignor.
176. Ibid. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-9.
177. See also Commissioner v. Barbour, 122 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Hel-
vering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
178. It should be noted, however, that in cases of divided control it may ie difficult
to determine to whom trust income should be taxed. Assume a person about to embari:
on a risky business venture with dim forebodings of judgment creditors some years hence;
with his worldly goods he creates a five-year trust precisely of the Clifford type but, as a
precaution to forestall a reversion should his fears materialize, provides that his eldest
son may at any time terminate the trust and acquire the corpus. Would the latter be a
candidate for taxability on the trust income under Commissioner v. Rdchardson, 121 F.
(2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ? True, he cannot exercise any control over the corpus until
he makes use of his power of termination; but "the possession of the power is determina-
tive, not the fortuitous manner of its use." David M. Heyman, 44 B. T. . 1009 (1941) ;
Whiteley v. Commissioner, 120 F. (2d) 782 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941). But cf. Helvering Y.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 121 F. (2d) 307 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) (estate tax; non-exer-
cise of power of appointment).
Furthermore, taxing someone other than the person who actually receives the in-
come may, in perfectly conceivable cases, result in a danger to the revenue. Assume a
paterfamilias who has made a success out of his vacuum cleaner business, his property
consisting of stock therein and of outside investments. Being of an adventurous turn of
mind, he contemplates risking a large part of his fortune in assisting the development
of an invention related to television. Before doing so, however, be trustees his vacuum
250 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.51: 213
What loopholes are left for diminishing surtaxes by anticipatory
arrangements? Under the Blair case the life beneficiary of a trust may
escape taxation on all or part of the income if the assignment equals
the temporal length of his estate. And an owner of property can still
reallocate the income thereon among his family and escape high surtax
brackets if he is willing to make outright gifts to spouse and children.
But, where husband or wife is the donee, in time even that avenue of
minimization may be closed, for presumably we have not heard the last
of the rejected provision of the Revenue Bill of 1941 which would render
mandatory the filing of a joint return by husband and wife.
cleaner shares, naming his wife and children life beneficiaries, but retaining extensive
control over the corpus, and, if you will, over the disposition of the income to any one
but himself. Subsequently his new venture into which he has poured all the rest of his
fortune proves a dismal failure. The vacuum cleaner company, however, continues to
prosper mightily. The consequent large trust income is taxable to the now pennilesq
settlor. What price the Clifford case then?
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APPENDIX
A. Cases following the Clifford ride -ith little or no discussion: Penn v. Commissioner,
109 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); First Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d)
448 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) ; Helvering v. Hormel, 111 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940),
remanded sub norn. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941); Thomson v. Helver-
ing, 114 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); Helvering 'r. Abraham, 115 F. (2d) 363
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Herbert AV. Hoover, 42 B. T. A. 289 (1940), on appeal C. C. A.
6th; Wffilliam J. McCormack, 43 B. T. A. 924 (1941) ; Maurice Jacobs, 3 C. C. H. 1941
Fed. Tax Serv. ff 7654-A (B. T. A. mem.).
B. Cases applyhg the Clifford rule to situations nore favorable to the taxpayer: Cox
v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 667
(1940); Reuter v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. Cl., 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.
S. 695 (1941); White v. Higgins, 116 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Commissioner
v. Berolzheimer, 116 F. (2d) 628 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Reuter v. Commissioner, 118 F.
(2d) 698 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941); Commissioner v. Barbour, 122 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Commissioner
v. Woolley, 122 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Morton Stein, 41 B. T. A. 994 (1940) ; George H. Deuble, 42 B.
T. A. 277 (1940) (in part), on appeal C. C. A. 6th; Purdon Smith Whiteley, 42 B. T. A.
316 (1940); Frank G. Hoover, 42 B. T. A. 786 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. 6th; H. S.
Richardson, 42 B. T. A. 830 (1940), aff'd sub nora. Richardson v. Commissioner, 121
F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Archibald G. Bush, 43 B. T. A. 535 (1941); Snowden
Fahnestock, 43 B. T. A. 569 (1941); William L. McKnight, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax
Serv. ff7271-B (B. T. A. mer.); Robert H. Cory, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv.
ff 7272-B (B. T. A. mem.); David M. Heyman, 44 B. T. A. 1009 (1941); Reginald B.
Parsons, 44 B. T. A. 1142 (1941) (in part); Ellis H. Warren, 3 C. C. I-L 1941 Fed. Tax
Serv. ff 7721 (B. T. A.); Ella E. Russell, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ff7724 (B.
T. A.).
C. Cases ref tsing to apply the Clifford rule: Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F. (2d) 929
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Commissioner v. Branch, 114 F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940);
Helvering v. Palmer, 115 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Kent v. Rothensies, 35 F.
Supp. 291 (E. D. Pa. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 120 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) ;
Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Jones v. Norris,
122 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941); Commissioner v. Jonas, 122 F. (2d) 169 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1941) ; Frick v. Driscoll, 4 P. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ff62,3893 (WN. D. Pa. 1941) ;
Stanley v. Smith, 4 P. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ff62,823 (D. Conn. 1941); Lolita S.
Armour, 41 B. T. A. 777 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. 7th; George H. Deuble, 42 B. T.
A. 277 (1940) (in part); Dunlevy T. Milbank, 41 B. T. A. 1014 (1940); Edward H.
Heller, 41 B. T. A. 1020 (1940)} Edna B. Elias, 41 B. T. A. 1109 (1940), rev'd .sub
nor. Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C, A. 2d, 1941); Susan Sturgis Barry,
42 B. T. A. 1 (1940); Antoinette K. Brown, 42 B. T. A. 693 (1940), remanded sb
nor. Commissioner v. Browrn, 4 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 9667 (C. C. A. 3d,
1941); Frank E. Wolcott, 42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940); John P. Wilson, 42 B. T. A. 1260
(1940), on appeal C. C. A. 7th; Elizabeth K. Lamont, 43 B. T. A. 61 (1940), on appeal
C. C. A. 2d; Lady Marian Bateman, 43 B. T. A. 69 (1940), on appeal C. C. A. Ist;
Arthur M1. Betts, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ff7116-D (B. T. A. mer.); William
J. Garland, 43 B. T. A. 731 (on rehearing, 1941); Jessie W. Donahue, 44 B. 1'. A. 329
(1941); Rose L. Ray, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ff7474-A (B. T. A. mer.);
Reginald B. Parsons, 44 B. T. A. 1142 (1941); John N. Fulham, 44 B. T. A. 1183
(1941); Estate of William Childs, 44 B. T. A. 1191 (1941); Frederick Ayer, 3 C. C. H.
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1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 7683 (B. T. A.). See also John R. MacManus Trust, 44 B. T. A.
508 (1941), where a taxpayer sought application of the rule on the theory that four
beneficiaries were the grantors of an amended trust and that hence the undistributed
income was taxable to them in four equal parts rather than to the trustee in folo.
D. Cases using Clifford rationale in cognate fields:
(1) Assignment of income: Huber v. Helvering, 117 F. (2d) 782 (App. D, C.
1941) ; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941).
(2) Section 166: Fulham v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 916 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940)
Helvering v. Dunning, 118 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941); R. Douglas
Stuart, 42 B. T. A. 1421 (1940).
(3) Section 167: Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 162 (C. C. A. 6th,
1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 706 (1941); Rand v. Helvering, 116 F. (2d)
929 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
E. Cases refusing to extend Clifford rationale to other fields: Commissioner v. Park,
113 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940); Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d) 331 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1940); Otto Peterson, 42 B. T. A. 102 (1940); Mary W. Pingree, 3 C. C. 1-.
1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 7660 (B. T. A.).
F. Cases remanded to board for consideration of applicability of Clifford rule: -Iorinl
v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941) ; Helvering v. Richter, 312 U. S. 561 (1941) ; Com-
missioner v. Ward, 119 F. (2d) 207 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Commissioner v. O'Keeffe,
118 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941); Commissioner v. Central Nat. Bank, 119 F. (2d)
470 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941); Commissioner v. Brown, 4 C. C. H. 1941 Fed, Tax Serv.
9667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
